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THE DECADE OF DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE
JAMES SAMPLE*
In the decade since Citizens United v. FEC, which, while consequential in
its own right, is also not responsible for all the ills attributed to it by its detractors,
the Supreme Court has decided a stunning number of what this Article terms to be
democracy cases. Each respective case is the subject of substantial scholarship within
its sphere—voting rights, contribution limits, public financing, partisan
gerrymandering, federal bribery law, and subvariations of each area—Decade of
Democracy’s Demise seeks to remove that scholarship from the respective topical
silos, and to develop and analyze a heretofore scarcely considered composite.
This Article contends that in democracy cases, the judicial minimalists on the
Court have actually engaged, during the decade, in extensive judicial fact
finding in order to justify their legal conclusions. In several of these cases the
Court has shown a willingness to ignore the legislative fact findings of Congress
(reflected in the McCain-Feingold legislation struck down in both Citizens
United and McCutcheon v. FEC and in the re-authorization of the Voting
Rights Act in Shelby County); and of state courts and legislatures (reflected in
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and Arizona Free
Enterprise v. Bennett). Indeed, within the democracy arena, the Court has
deferred to legislative fact finding basically only when the fact-finding body was
itself hostile to participatory democracy, and actually acted upon that hostility.
Examples of this antiparticipatory deference include the Husted voter purge, the
Crawford v. Indiana decision in 2008 that, while technically outside the
defined decade, spawned numerous carbon copy voter ID laws in states around
the nation, and the deference to legislative redistricting measures that, in the
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. Thanks to
Lindsay Wasserman for her keen and tireless research assistance. Nick Testa and
Lauren Fitzsimmons also provided valuable contributions. This Article benefited greatly
from the insights offered by fellow panelists at the January 2020 Symposium. Finally,
gratitude is owed to James Sullivan and the staff of the American University Law Review for
their exemplary work and professionalism. Any errors or shortcomings are mine.
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instances of Maryland and North Carolina, are not only inconsistent with oneperson, one-vote norms, but are openly and transparently acknowledged by their
progenitors to be so.
The Decade of Democracy’s Demise asserts that while the short-term
impact of the Court’s decisions in the last decade skews in a favorable direction
for conservatives, the long-term impact is not necessarily favorable to either
political party, so much as it favors politically and financially empowered
interests who seek to employ that empowerment so as to exacerbate their
antidemocratic advantages. While this dynamic is temporarily good news for
conservative partisans, it may, at some future juncture be good news for liberal
partisans (although historically, at least since the Civil Rights era, they are less
inclined towards antiparticipatory measures), but more importantly than any
partisan valence, this Article asserts that the broader consequences for American
democracy are grim indeed.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he Court has fully turned its back on that which I think it has a primary
responsibility to protect, and that’s our electoral system.

—Former Attorney General Eric Holder1

1. Liam Chalk, Former A.G. Eric Holder Advocates for SCOTUS Terms Limits, Blasts
Barr at Pomona Talk, STUDENT LIFE (Feb. 18, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://tsl.news/ericholder-payton-lecture [https://perma.cc/2Z7C-ZTC2].
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The year 2020 is the ten-year anniversary of the Court’s controversial
Citizens United v. FEC2 decision. Regrettably, this Article asserts that,
beginning with Citizens United, the Court’s decisions in the prior
decade have, in the aggregate, dramatically harmed representationreinforcing values in our democratic processes. Moreover, this Article
asserts that the Court majority has aggressively substituted its own fact
finding when faced with legislative measures that favor participatory
and equality values. However, the Court majority has shown great
deference to legislatures when considering measures that are, on their
face, hostile to participation and equality. While it is impossible to
prove a results-oriented motive for the discrepancy, this Article
ultimately contends that it is difficult not to find a brazen lack of
intellectual consistency in this line of decisions.
In perhaps the most striking example of this discrepancy, the majority in
Shelby County v. Holder3 discarded decades of Congressional findings on the
continued necessity of preventive ex ante safeguards in the Voting Rights
Act.4 Then, in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,5 the Court emphatically
accepted the findings by Congress to justify an Ohio voting purge, with
Justice Alito arguing with nary a hint of irony that, “[i]t is not our
prerogative to judge the reasonableness of that congressional judgment.”6
Some argue that one aggregate effect of the decade of decisions has
been an erosion of public trust in the Court, although hard to measure
and far from the most consequential of the effects.7 Alan Brownstein
asserts that the impact of these recent decisions
is to cumulatively increase the influence of the wealthy and powerful in
the electoral process and to facilitate actions by current government
officials to manipulate electoral rules and practices in ways that
entrench their party’s status, and correspondingly, to undermine the
confidence of the American people in the political system.8

While preserving the capital of public trust in the Court is important,
the focus of this Article is the more tangible consequences for rankand-file representation-reinforcing norms. In the span of a decade, a
majority of the Court has imposed its will on nearly every major
2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
4. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. 2018).
5. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).
6. Id. at 1848.
7. Alan Brownstein, Supreme Court Rulings Come at a Cost in Public Confidence, HILL (June
5, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/446936-supreme-court-needsto-consider-cumulating-constitutional-costs [https://perma.cc/YS7B-DA3T].
8. Id.
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element of our democratic processes: from voting to gerrymandering
to campaign finance and even to bribery and misconduct. In these
decisions, the Court majority systematically disregarded legislative will
at their leisure and replaced it with their own judgment of fairness and
societal need. During the past decade, the Court consistently rejected
legislative attempts at equalizing access to democracy, dismissed attempts
by Congress to target quid pro quo corruption, narrowed the definition
of quid pro quo public corruption to the eye of a needle, and rolled out
the red carpet for partisan gerrymandering. Even more consequentially,
there is a snowball effect at play: the decade of new high Court precedent
in the areas of campaign finance and voting rights gets extended yet
further as waves of more and more conservative justices join the federal
bench.9 Despite this, there is a surprising amount of apathy on the
political left regarding the courts.10
Part I of this Article details the major Supreme Court decisions of
the past decade dealing with campaign finance regulations, public
financing, and a high-profile consideration of a gubernatorial bribery
charge. Part II considers the Court’s decisions in the areas of voting
rights, voter suppression, and partisan gerrymandering.
I. KEY CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND BRIBERY DECISIONS
A. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Citizens United v.
FEC.11 As Alicia Bannon posits, Citizens United is one of “the rare
Supreme Court decision[s] that many non-lawyers know by name.”12
The Court’s five-to-four decision garnered widespread notoriety as the
majority struck down a federal ban on corporate independent
expenditures,13 in turn overruling decades of precedent, disregarding
landmark campaign finance legislation, and ultimately ushering in the
decade of democracy’s demise.

9. See Dahlia Lithwick, Democrats Still Haven’t Learned Their Lesson About the Courts,
SLATE (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/08/
democrats-courts-what-will-it-take-debates-election-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/2GNN-T683].
10. Id.
11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12. Alicia Bannon, Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 169, 174 (2018).
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–39.
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At issue in Citizens United was a corporation’s right to use its general
treasury funds to make election-related independent expenditures.14 The
origin of this case can be traced back to January of 2008, when Citizens
United, a nonprofit corporation, released a ninety-minute documentary
entitled Hillary: The Movie, which provided a critical review of Hillary
Clinton, then candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.15
Citizens United initially released Hillary in movie theatres and on DVD, but
in an effort to expand its exposure, Citizens United sought to use its general
treasury funds to make Hillary available through video-on-demand within
thirty days of the 2008 primary elections.16 Citizens United subsequently
produced advertisements to run on broadcast and cable television in order
to promote the release of its documentary.17
However, this tactic directly violated The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA),18 a landmark piece of legislation that Congress
enacted to address large contributions made by corporations and unions to
political campaigns.19 A provision at the heart of the BCRA, § 441b,
specifically sought to prohibit corporations and unions from using their
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that
is considered an “electioneering communication,”20 or speech that
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a particular candidate.21

14. See id. at 320–21.
15. Id. at 319–20.
16. Id. at 320–21.
17. Id. at 320.
18. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
19. Brief for the Federal Election Commission at 10–11, McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 02-1674). The purpose of § 441b was to limit the creation of “sham
issue ads” that were produced to evade existing campaign finance laws. The ads, created
primarily by corporations and unions, would ordinarily focus on a named candidate and
aim to influence both elected officials and the electorate. Congress ultimately found that
the paper trail left behind by these ads indicated that their true purpose was to influence
elections, rather than educate the public on social issues. This was supported by the fact
that the corporations and unions behind these ads hired campaign consultants to devise
messaging and even had the ads poll tested by professionals. These ads typically aired in
the days directly leading up to an election and ceased promptly after Election Day—clearly
intended to impact the upcoming election. The BCRA thus created time-based restrictions
of thirty and sixty days before an election to only bar those sham ads which were intended
to influence federal elections.
20. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. 2018)). The Act
defined an electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable or satellite
communication which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made
within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a).
21. § 434(f)(3)(a).
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Citizens United brought suit against the FEC seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief out of concern that it risked receiving penalties for
violating § 441b.22 The district court denied this motion for a preliminary
injunction and granted summary judgment to the FEC, subsequently
leading Citizens United to appeal to the Supreme Court.23
When the case came before the Court, the Justices were tasked with
determining whether § 441b’s prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary.24 However, the
Justices went on to declare that in the exercise of judicial responsibility,
the Court must consider the facial validity of § 441b because it could
not resolve the as-applied challenge on narrower grounds without
“chilling political speech.”25
In a broad ruling, the Court struck down § 441b’s ban on corporate
and union independent expenditures, opining that § 441b’s
prohibition is an outright ban on speech, and as such, is in violation of
the First Amendment.26 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
determined that the First Amendment does not allow the viewpoints
of certain subjects, such as wealthy corporations, to be disfavored.
Thus, the majority resolved, any restriction, such as § 441b, that allows
speech by some and not others is impermissible.27
In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected several compelling
interests advanced by the government in support of restrictions on
unlimited corporate spending in the electoral context.28 One of these
compelling interests was the antidistortion rationale contained in Austin
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.29 Under Austin’s rationale, the
government had a compelling interest in restricting unfettered
corporate political speech in order to combat the distorting effects that
large aggregations of wealth have on our electoral process.30 The
majority conclusively denied this rationale, reasoning that it would
allow the government to ban political speech just “because the speaker
22. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id. at 322, 324.
25. Id. at 329.
26. Id. at 337.
27. Id. at 340–41.
28. See id. at 348–62.
29. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
30. Id. at 659–60 (holding that the Michigan state law in question was justified in
that it prevented “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”).
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is an association that has taken on the corporate form.”31 The Court also
remained unpersuaded by the government’s interest in protecting
shareholders, as the majority found little evidence of abuse that shareholders
could not correct “through the procedures of corporate democracy.”32
Most germane to this Article’s analysis, the Court rejected the
government’s anticorruption justification, in turn drastically narrowing
the kind of corruption that could justify regulations on independent
expenditures to those that involved quid pro quo corruption.33 While the
majority maintained that wealthy corporate donors did in fact have influence
over and enhanced access to elected officials, they refused to accept that this
amounted to the type of corruption that warranted any reasonable
restrictions.34 The majority concluded that Congress had created “categorical
bans on speech that are asymmetrical to preventing quid pro quo
corruption,” and therefore, the “ban on corporate political speech during
the critical preelection period is not a permissible remedy.”35
The dissenting justices expressed their disdain toward the brazen
lack of judicial restraint the majority utilized in handing down this
decision.36 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, proffered that the
majority transformed an as-applied challenge into a facial challenge
because the Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case
and ultimately seized an opportunity to transform the face of campaign
finance law.37 In his dissent, Justice Stevens lamented that “[t]he Court
operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes
down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role that
corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”38 The decision
amounted to the Court’s complete rejection of the extensive
Congressional fact finding that went into the passage of the BCRA, with
little evidence to substantiate their rejection.39 The dissent argued that the
Court should have pursued a path of judicial deference, particularly in an
area where Congress developed a record that was a “remarkable testament to
the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, unions, lobbyists, and
politicians may go about scratching each other’s backs—and which amply

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
Id. at 357.
See id. at 359.
Id. at 361 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 398–99 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399–400.
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supported Congress’ determination to target a limited set of especially
destructive practices.”40 Justice Stevens rebuked the majority by declaring that
we [as Justices] have a vital role to play in ensuring that elections
remain at least minimally open, fair, and competitive. But it is the
height of recklessness to dismiss Congress’ years of bipartisan
deliberation and its reasoned judgment on this basis, without first
confirming that the statute in question was intended to be, or will
function as, a restraint on electoral competition.41

The Citizens United Court, in systematically dismissing the extensive
congressional fact finding that went into the creation of the BCRA, has
implicated the efficacy of our democracy. The ruling has enhanced the
influence of wealthy and powerful corporations in the electoral
context, threatened the independence of the judiciary, incentivized
judicial incoherence, and spurred a dangerous erosion of public
confidence in the integrity of our democratic processes.42
In analyzing the scope of outside spending in the post-Citizens United
context, Douglas M. Spencer and Abby K. Wood posit that the most
notorious consequence of Citizens United has been the emergence of
independent-expenditure-only political action committees, known as
Super PACs.43 In the wake of Citizens United, Super PACs have the ability
to amass exorbitant sums of money from corporations and unions to
spend in support of or in opposition to candidates.44 In noting the
potent influence that Super PACs have on federal elections, Spencer
and Wood contend that “Super PACs have become sidecars to each
campaign’s motorcycle: ostensibly separate entities, but in essence
comprising one vehicle.”45 Of particular concern is that the bulk of money
from Super PACs has come from individual donors, suggesting that Super
PACs act as conduits around existing individual contribution limits.46
40. Id. at 448.
41. Id. at 462.
42. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy posits that this decision accelerated the Roberts Court’s
“deregulatory pace” and acted as a catalyst to solidify the Court’s role as legislator in
our democracy. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating Corruption, 13 HARV. L & POL’Y
REV. 471, 488 (2019). Torres-Spelliscy further postulates that through the Court’s
persistent intolerance of campaign finance laws, it has made “mincemeat out of the
concept of corruption.” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Trump’s Judicial Picks Are Gutting
Campaign Finance Law, LAW360 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1195479/trump-s-judicial-picks-are-gutting-campaign-finance-law.
43. Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An
Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 330 (2014).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.

2020]

THE DECADE OF DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE

1567

While Super PAC funding from individual donors is not a direct result of
Citizens United, Spencer and Wood reveal that the Citizens United decision
has also allowed for increased nonprofit political activism from groups
such as 501(c) organizations.47 As the Center for Responsive Politics
reported, in the 2006 federal election cycle, not a single dollar was spent
by 501(c) organizations on independent expenditures or electioneering
communications.48 However, the 2010 election cycle saw a tremendous
uptick in nonprofit political activism, with forty-two percent of all outside
spending originating from 501(c) organizations.49
The recent abundance of political fundraising from groups such as
nonprofits is particularly troubling as these groups are not required to
disclose the source of their funding to the public, thereby leaving
voters completely in the dark as to the identity of the donors who
backed these powerful groups.50 Moreover, while Super PACs must
disclose the identity of their donors, they are free to accept unlimited
contributions from “dark money” nonprofits that are not held to the
same disclosure standards.51
Sarah C. Haan reveals that the 2012 election experienced a “sharp
rise” in outside spending as compared to elections in the pre-Citizens
United period.52 Citizens United allowed outside spending from Super PACs
and 501(c) “dark money” organizations to increase dramatically.53
However, Haan indicates that a large percentage of reported outside
spending that occurred in the 2012 federal election also came from
privately held, for-profit business entities.54 Similarly to the aforementioned
concerns regarding undisclosed political spending from nonprofits,
spending from privately held, for-profit business entities poses its own
unique disclosure problems. As Haan discovered, more than forty
47. Id.
48. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape,
OPENSECRETS (May 5, 2011), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizensunited-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape [https://perma.cc/FM93-7JYY].
49. Id.
50. Michael Greubel, Citizens United: 8 Years Later, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L.:
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/03/07/citizensunited-8-years-later [https://perma.cc/5M2E-FWBL].
51. Karl Evers-Hillstrom et al., A Look at the Impact of Citizens United on its 9th Anniversary,
OPENSECRETS (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/citizens-united
[https://perma.cc/K3L2-KX9M].
52. Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure by PrivatelyHeld Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1150–51 (2014).
53. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/fes_summ.php [https://perma.cc/9WRU-8J6Y].
54. See Haan, supra note 52, at 1154, 1160.
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percent of election-related spending by privately held, for-profit
entities in 2012 was donated in a way that obscured the origin of the
funds.55 Haan explains that a large percentage of these donations
belonged to networks of affiliated private companies tracing back to
one or more individual donors.56 While these for-profit business
entities were required to comply with existing disclosure rules, voters
were “likely to view these private companies’ donations as the
commitments of many separate economic actors” while in reality the
money came from the pockets of a few wealthy individuals.57
Enhanced corporate spending skews voter impressions, undermines
representation values, and yields a significant power asymmetry for rankand-file voters, who are relatively powerless against wealthy corporations.
In addition to the aforementioned scholarship, empirical data compiled
over the last decade clearly indicates a remarkable expansion in the scope
of election spending by outside groups.58 As data collected from the
midterm elections directly following the Court’s 2010 decision showed,
Citizens United impacted federal elections rather quickly.59 For example,
outside groups spent a modest $69,565,098 on political spending in the
2006 midterm elections.60 However, in the months directly following the
Citizens United decision in 2010, outside spending increased to
$309,833,966.61 This upward trajectory has continued into the most
recent 2018 midterm election, where political spending from outside
groups reached an unprecedented $1,081,968,874.62 The influence
that outside groups such as Super PACs and political nonprofits have
had on our federal elections is exemplified further in data reflecting
total outside spending from each election cycle.63 In the 2006 federal
election cycle, outside spending capped out at $2,365,241.64 In 2010,
just months after the Citizens United decision, total outside spending
reached $14,868,086.65 The total outside spending in federal elections

55. Id. at 1173.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Outside Spending, supra note 53.
59. See Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php [https://perma.cc/88JSF4LE] (charting a significant increase in outside spending in recent federal elections).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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continued to skyrocket in the 2018 election cycle, as spending from
outside groups increased to an astonishing $99,236,743.66 The
amplification of spending from outside groups in the wake of Citizens
United may be demonstrated via data compiled on competitive Senate
races. The Brennan Center for Justice reports that outside expenditures
increased from around $3 million per Senate race in 2010 to over $8
million per Senate race in 2014.67 Overall, outside groups spent $486
million on Senate races in 2014, a remarkable increase from the $220
million that was spent just four years prior in 2010.68 The enhanced outside
spending that has occurred in the aftermath of Citizens United has also helped
to create the most expensive election cycles ever in our nation’s history.69 In
the pre-Citizens United period, outside spending groups had only slight
influence over Senate races. The 2008 Senate race in Minnesota, the most
expensive race of the cycle, saw only $24,396,259 in spending from outside
groups.70 This spending changed entirely post-Citizens United; outside groups
repeatedly shattered spending records with each new election cycle.71 For
example, in 2018, outside spending in Senate races reached a new extreme
in Florida, with $92,878,026 spent by outside groups.72
The astonishing growth of Super PACs in the years following the
Citizens United decision is also supported by financial activity data from
various election cycles over the past decade. In 2010, there were just
eighty-three Super PACs who spent a total of $62,641,448 during the
election cycle.73 These numbers completely transformed during the
2018 election cycle, where 2395 Super PACs raised a total of
$1,567,304,432, of which $822,068,922 was spent.74 Citizens United has
allowed Super PACs to surpass national party committees as the top
66. Id.
67. Neilan S. Chaturvedi, Outside Spending in Senate Races: Danger or Dud?, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Aug.
16, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/outside-spending-senate-races-danger-or-dud [https://perma.cc/7D32-6VBF].
68. Sarah Childress, Report: After Citizens United, Outside Spending Doubles, PBS:
FRONTLINE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/report-aftercitizens-united-outside-spending-doubles [https://perma.cc/HZ4Y-4Z6W].
69. Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 51.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, https://www.
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
[https://perma.cc/9SUZ-MWVF?type=image].
74. 2018 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, https://www.
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
[https://perma.cc/44BV-UCC8].
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outside spending groups in federal elections.75 In fact, in the 2018
election cycle, the top three outside spending groups were establishment
connected Super PACs.76 Reflecting on the exorbitant outside spending
that has occurred in years since Citizens United, Michael Greubel argues
that it is unlikely that outside spending will be curbed anytime soon.77
Greubel contends that the only way that spending from outside groups
will subside in the coming years is through widespread bipartisan
support and a complete reversal of Citizens United.78
Another notable shift in spending that has transpired in the wake of
Citizens United is in the judiciary, where money has shifted hands from
candidates to independent groups.79 As Erenberg and Berg reveal,
candidate fundraising fell to just over $27 million in 2009 to 2010,
which is significantly lower than the $33.2 million that candidates
raised four years prior.80 Judicial retention elections also reflect an
enhancement of judicial spending. As Erenberg and Berg describe,
“judicial retention elections before 2010 were sleepy affairs, immune
to big-money politics.”81 However, they warn that independent
expenditures in future judicial elections may routinely overtake
candidate spending as partisan and special interests attempt to gain
influence over American courts.82
Alicia Bannon contemplates the consequences that enhanced
independent expenditures pose to the fairness and integrity of judicial
races. Bannon contends that judicial races had become very similar to
ordinary elections even in years prior to Citizens United, as “wealthy
special interest groups have increasingly turned their attention, and
wallets, to judicial races.”83 However, Bannon explains that Citizens
75. Evers-Hillstrom et al., supra note 51.
76. Id.
77. Greubel, supra note 50.
78. Id.
79. Debra Erenberg & Matt Berg, The Dark Night Rises: The Growing Role of Independent
Expenditures in Judicial Elections After Citizens United, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 512 (2013).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 515–16.
82. Id. at 518. Erenberg and Berg discuss the 2010 retention election contest in
Iowa which shocked the nation, where voters decided to remove three justices from
the Iowa Supreme Court. Id. at 505. Erenberg and Berg highlight that the removal of
these justices was spurred as a result of their decision in Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 2009), where the court held that Iowa’s Defense of Marriage Act violated
the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution. 763 N.W.2d at 906. In the 2010
Iowa race, opponents spent close to $1 million in independent expenditures to remove
these justices from the bench. Erenberg & Berg, supra note 79, at 505.
83. Bannon, supra note 12, at 172.
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United eliminated campaign finance restrictions in states where they
existed, maintained the legal status quo in states where they did not,
and foreclosed any future reforms from coming to fruition.84
Functionally, Citizens United became a “one-way ratchet” for states and
the regulation of money in judicial elections.85 As a result, Citizens
United made it easier for interest groups to influence federal elections
via shell organizations and nonprofit groups.86 However, these groups
soon turned their attention to spending in state elections, particularly
at the supreme court level. Bannon argues that the “composition and
transparency of spending in judicial races” has seen the most significant
effect,87 as outside groups who do not disclose their donors have
flooded judicial elections at the state level.88
Bannon warns that this transformation poses serious risks to the
fairness and integrity of state courts. She urges that spending via
nontransparent outside groups “can obscure the identity of powerful
interests seeking to shape courts’ ideological composition, interests
which may have a strong economic interest in how state courts rule on
important legal issues, or even a direct stake in pending litigation.”89
This is particularly problematic for the sake of judicial integrity as it
deprives the voting public of the information necessary to assess the
motives and credibility of the special interest groups that seek to shape
their own state courts.90 As Bannon concludes, “[p]olitical and special
interest pressure, if not adequately checked, threatens this basic
promise of equal justice, undermining both the appearance and reality
of fairness in state court systems.”91 Adam Skaggs from the Brennan
Center for Justice also reflects these concerns as he highlights that
corporations and special interests have a very obvious incentive to
support judges they believe they will come before.92 Skaggs notes that
84. Id. at 176.
85. Id. (quoting James Sample, Retention Elections 2010, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 393 (2011)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 171.
88. Id. at 176.
89. Id. at 180.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 185. While commentators may find solace in the 2015 Court decision
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015), that decision only upheld restrictions
on judicial candidates being able to personally solicit money for their campaigns and
did nothing to stem the flow of money into Super PACs favoring these candidates.
92. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED
ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2 (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_Buying-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AMH-FGJP]. Skaggs notes that the rise of
this type of conflict of interest puts increased pressures on independent and impartial judges;
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at the state level, this incentive arises in high courts where a majority
or swing vote can determine the outcome of multi-million-dollar
claims.93 Unsurprisingly, business interests and lawyers make up almost
two-thirds of all contributions to state supreme court candidates.94
Erwin Chemerinsky underscores the disturbing influence that
exorbitant corporate spending in judicial elections poses to our
American democracy, as thirty-nine states have some form of judicial
elections.95 This record spending in judicial races creates not only the
perception but, often times, the actuality of pay-to-play justice in state
courts.96 While Chemerinsky argues that we may see regulations in
elections within the judicial realm in the future,97 the reality is that
judicial elections are here to stay. This begs the question as to how the
Supreme Court will treat campaign finance in the judicial context
should the issue come before it.
Richard Hasen examines another significant democratic consequence
that has arisen in the wake of Citizens United: judicial incoherence within
the Supreme Court. When the Court decided Citizens United in 2010, the
majority celebrated its opinion as a return to Buckley v. Valeo,98 the socalled “fountainhead” of campaign finance jurisprudence.99 However,
Hasen argues that, in reality, this supposed harmony will only amplify
incoherence within the Court’s campaign finance doctrine as the
the public is forced to rely on judges’ duty to act in good faith and remove themselves from
conflict situations.
93. Id. A palpable consequence of justice being sold to the highest bidder.
94. Id.
95. Erwin Chemerinsky, Richard Hasen & James Sample, Citizens United Impact
on Judicial Elections, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 685, 686 (2012).
96. Id. at 691.
97. Id. at 688–90. Chemerinsky proffers that the answer to this question will most
likely depend on the perception of Justice Kennedy, due to his vote in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). In Caperton, Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s
majority in ruling that a Virginia Supreme Court justice was required to recuse himself
from hearing the appeal of a $50 million-dollar verdict because the defendant in the
case contributed over $3 million in support of the justice’s recent campaign. 556 U.S.
at 872, 884. However, Justice Kennedy’s position in the Court’s majority in Citizens
United suggests to Chemerinsky that “ex ante limits on expenditures would not be
acceptable, but that ex post remedy of recusal is acceptable.” Chemerinsky, supra note
95, at 694. However, as the moderator of the panel Richard Hansen points out, there
have been few successful Caperton motions since the Court’s decision, which indicates
that the recusal standard in Caperton requires such an egregious problem that the
standard will rarely be met. Id. at 696.
98. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
99. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 583 (2011).
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Court is unlikely to take the decision to its most extreme ends.100 Hasen
explains that the Court’s “narrow, crabbed, view of corruption”101 and
rejection of the antidistortion rationale in Citizens United will force the
Justices to proclaim that limits may never be placed on money in
politics, if they wish to maintain doctrinal coherence.102 However, this
is not the path that the Court will likely take, particularly in areas such
as foreign-initiated spending, spending in judicial elections, and
reasonable limits on campaign contributions made directly to
candidates.103 Hasen posits that the Court will ignore the inconsistent
portions of its Citizens United ruling if it wishes to impose sensible and
appealing spending limits because the justifications for these limits will
come in the form of the antidistortion and anticorruption rationales
that the majority emphatically rejected in Citizens United.104 This
inconsistency will ultimately delegitimize the judicial system as
coherence on the highest court in the land has both doctrinal and
theoretical importance within our judiciary.105
For some, the majority’s ruling in Citizens United is lauded as a
powerful victory for free speech and a landmark for political
freedom.106 As Joel Gora asserts, Citizens United reaffirmed that the
“core purpose of the First Amendment is to guarantee that the people,
not the government, get to determine what they want to say . . . .”107
This notion stands in stark opposition to the views of other scholars
such as Stephen Feldman, who categorizes Citizens United as an attempt
by the Roberts Court to promote its probusiness agenda, allowing the
private sphere to subsume the public and in turn endangering our

100. Id. at 585.
101. Id. at 583.
102. Id. at 584, 595.
103. Id. at 585.
104. Id. at 606–09.
105. Id. at 604–05. Doctrinally, the question of judicial coherence “is important as
the federal, state, and local governments attempt to rework their campaign finance
laws to comport with both the Citizens United decision and for the likely lower courts’
judicial reactions to that decision.” Id. On a theoretical level, the coherence of
Supreme Court doctrine “sheds some light on the interaction of legal doctrine and
the political legitimacy of the Court.” Id.
106. See generally Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 85 (2016) (arguing that, despite widespread criticism,
the Citizens United decision “embodied and applied classic First Amendment
principles . . . especially the notion that it is the people, not the government, that must
determine the nature and range of political speech”).
107. Id. at 66.
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democratic system.108 The ramifications that have stemmed from the
Citizens United decision have unquestionably undermined public
confidence in key aspects of the democratic system, including the
integrity of the government and the fairness of the judiciary.109
This perceived consequence is supported by empirical data
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2018, which indicates that there
is overwhelming bipartisan support for limits on political campaign
spending amongst most Americans.110 The research indicates that seventyseven percent of the public believes that there should be limits on the
amount of money individuals and organizations can spend on political
campaigns.111 Moreover, this research demonstrates that roughly sevenin-ten people believe that people who contribute more money to elected
officials have more influence than others who do not contribute as
much.112 This research clearly exemplifies the public’s lack of confidence
in the most intrinsic values of our democracy.
While disheartening, Richard Hasen interestingly points out the
importance that public opinion has over the Supreme Court. Hasen
posits that the Justices do in fact care about what the public thinks and
respond directly to public pressures as a result.113 With this in mind, Hasen
argues that it is unlikely that the Court will move in an extreme direction
either way when it comes to the future of campaign finance decisions.114
However, the demographic of the Court is transforming in an unnerving
way as the conservative bloc gains power, making it unclear whether
Hasen’s argument will hold true in the years to come.
While Hasen’s assertion may address the Supreme Court’s
receptiveness towards the public, it does little to quell the legitimate fears
that many have regarding the Court’s complete unwillingness to defer to
108. Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism
Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 324 (2015).
109. See Bannon, supra note 12, at 180–81 (arguing that secret spending in judicial
elections can obscure conflicts of interest and erode public confidence in the integrity
of state courts); Hasen, supra note 99, at 606–09 (claiming that Citizens United could
enable massive foreign spending in U.S. elections that could cause voters to believe that
foreign nationals are improperly influencing U.S. elections or legislative decisions).
110. Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors
Have Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (May 8, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limitcampaign-spending-say-big-donors-have-greater-political-influence
[https://perma.cc/JUJ2-E5PE].
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Hasen, supra note 99, at 622.
114. Id.
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legislative judgment. As shown in the context of the Citizens United
decision, the level of deference that the Court gives to legislative findings
has grave consequences on the rule of law and the efficacy of American
democracy. While Citizens United has become the face of money in politics,
it is only the first of several Supreme Court decisions where the Justices
have completely repudiated the extensive fact finding and wisdom of
federal and state legislatures, in turn transforming the campaign finance
landscape and democracy as a whole.
B. American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock
In American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock,115 the Supreme Court
was presented with an opportunity to reconsider its holding in Citizens
United—an opportunity that the Court conclusively declined.
At issue in the case was the constitutionality of Montana’s Corrupt
Practices Act,116 which required that a “corporation may not make . . . an
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that
supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”117 Specifically at issue
was whether Citizens United applied to this Montana law. The law had
been around since a 1912 ballot initiative and was considered part of
the Montana political fabric.118
In a per curiam decision, the Court’s five-to-four majority ruled
“there can be no serious doubt that” Citizens United does apply, issuing
a summary reversal.119 As Anthony Johnstone asserts, at that point in time
115. 567 U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam).
116. The Act was part of a one-hundred-year-old state ban on corporate spending
prior to being overturned by the Court. Franita Tolson, Introduction: The Law of
Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights and the Judicial Regulation
of The Political Thicket, 43 FLA ST. L. REV. 345, 349 (2016).
117. Am. Tradition, 567 U.S. at 516 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)).
118. Amy Davidson Sorkin, Remember Montana: The Supreme Court Won’t Reexamine
Citizens United, NEW YORKER (June 25, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/amy-davidson/remember-montana-the-supreme-court-wont-reexamine-citizensunited [https://perma.cc/TG5S-SE5Z].
119. Am. Tradition, 567 U.S. at 516–17 (citing U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2). It is
important to note that the same five conservative justices in the majority in Citizens
United were again in the majority in American Tradition. Christopher Terry & Mitchell
Bard, Milwaukee Radio Public File Data, 1998–2011: An Empirical Analysis of Issue
Advertising After the BCRA and Citizens United, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 159
(2013). Anthony Johnstone contends that the summary disposition is part of an
increasingly common trend which has been criticized by Alex Hemmer as “a form of
judicial carelessness in which summary disposition is used not simply to manage and
oversee lower courts’ dockets, but—contrary to tradition and reason—to make new
law.” Anthony Johnstone, Foreword: The State of the Republican Form of Government in
Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 5, 14 (2013) (quoting Alex Hemmer, Courts as Managers:
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Citizens United was “settled law as to the states for little more reason
than because the Court had said so.”120 Joseph Fishkin and William
Forbath contend that the Court based its belief that there was “nothing
new to see” on the premise that “the only aspect of the Constitution in
play is a First Amendment liberty to speak and spend.”121
After the Court’s decision in American Tradition, Montana state
officials, as well as most of the Montana general public, responded with
indignance and resistance.122 Stand With Montanans, a state-wide political
organization, gained substantial support in the months following the
Court’s decision to campaign for a national constitutional amendment
that would prohibit campaign contributions from corporations.123
The four dissenting liberal justices on the Court asserted that
Montana should have at least been granted oral argument to provide
the Court the opportunity to reconsider Citizens United’s application in
the case, if not Citizens United itself.124 The dissent echoed the remarks
of Justice Stevens in his dissent in Citizens United. In writing for the
dissent, Justice Breyer emphasized the findings of Montana’s Supreme
Court that the state had a compelling interest in limiting independent
expenditures by corporations given the history and political landscape of
Montana.125 By denying Montana the opportunity to brief and argue its

American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 209, 210 (2013)).
120. Johnstone, supra note 119, at 15.
121. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669, 695 (2014).
122. Neil K. Sawhney, Legislative Note, Advisory Initiatives as a Cure for the Ills of Direct
Democracy? A Case Study of Montana Initiative 166, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 589, 594
(2013) (citing Laura Lundquist, Montana Reacts to Supreme Court Campaign Finance
Decision, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (June 26, 2012), http://www.bozemandaily
chronicle.com/news/politics/article_9909d186-bf49-11e1-8c24-001a4bcf887a.html.
Despite the outcome, Attorney General Bullock remained optimistic about the future
of campaign finance regulation, stating that “the last word has not been spoken on the
issue of how we preserve a viable democracy in which everyday people have a
meaningful voice.” Lundquist, supra.
123. Sawhney, supra note 122, at 595.
124. Am. Tradition, 567 U.S. at 518. Justice Ginsburg, in a statement explaining her
vote to block the Montana decision, viewed the case as “an opportunity to consider
whether, in light of the huge sums deployed to buy candidates’ allegiance, Citizens
United should continue to hold sway.” Adam Liptak, Mystery of Citizens United Sequel Is
Format, Not Ending, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/12/us/in-citizens-united-ii-how-justices-rule-may-be-an-issue-itself.html.
125. Am. Tradition, 567 U.S. at 517 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Montana
Supreme Court considered the political landscape at the time of the Act’s passage in
1912, the state government was “under a mere shell of legal authority, and the real
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position, the Court deprived Montana the ability to empirically challenge
the contention that unlimited and unregulated corporate spending
actually corrupted politics.126 Michael Morely asserts, “[i]f the Court
wished to categorically preclude any governmental entity from limiting
independent expenditures as a matter of law, without regard to the
existence of extrinsic facts, then it should have framed its conclusion . . . as
a purely legal assertion, rather than a factually contingent holding.”127
Christopher Terry and Mitchell Bard contend that Montana’s
“missed opportunity is indicative of a larger problem that surrounds
the Citizens United case: one of empirical evidence.”128 Empirical
evidence, they believe, “would go a long way toward settling the debate
on the case’s impact on political speech.”129 They further argue that
empirical data provides the best opportunity to assess Citizens United
without political or ideological bias.130
Andrew Moshirnia and Aaron Dozerman similarly contend that the
facts in American Tradition Partnership were integral to the outcome of
the case—distinguishing it from its Citizens United counterpart.131 The facts
illustrated Montana’s history of undue political influence, which
unquestionably justified the state’s compelling interest in preventing

social and political power was wielded by powerful corporate managers to further their
own business interests.” W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 11 (Mont.
2011). The Act was passed through one of the first voter initiatives in Montana—
stressing citizens’ frustration with political corruption and the lack of public
accountability. Sawhney, supra note 122, at 594.
126. Terry & Bard, supra note 119, at 159; see also Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard,
Judicial Elections and Issue Advertising: A Two State Study, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579
(2017) (exploring the relationship between outside spending and judicial candidates).
127. Michael T. Morely, Contingent Constitutionality, Legislative Facts, and Campaign
Finance Law, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 713–14 (2016).
128. Terry & Bard, supra note 119, at 159.
129. Id. at 160. But not to all. Justice James C. Nelson, one of the dissenting justices
in the Montana Supreme Court’s decision, recognized albeit begrudgingly that Citizens
United applied to this case. He stated, “I find myself in the distasteful position of having to
defend the applicability of a controlling precedent with which I profoundly disagree.” W.
Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 18 (Mont. 2011) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
130. Terry & Bard, supra note 126, at 586. Terry and Bard support this position by
showing research demonstrating a correlation between direct contributions to justices
and favorable rulings. Id. (citing Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An Opening for
Quid Pro Quo Corruption? Issue Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races Before and After
Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 318 (2015)).
131. Andrew V. Moshirnia & Aaron T. Dozerman, In All Fairness: Using Political
Broadcast Access Doctrine to Tailor Public Campaign Fund Matching, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 641, 656–57 (2015).
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further corruption.132 Justice Breyer indicated in his dissent that he
agreed, recognizing “that independent expenditures by corporations did
in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.”133
Critics of the Court’s decision in American Tradition Partnership
concurred. The Brennan Center contends that the Court’s decision to
strike down Montana’s law without so much as reviewing the extensive
and powerful record was a “serious mistake.”134 The Montana Supreme
Court, in its decision, even emphasized the importance of the facts, stating
that “[i]ssues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence
upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a
transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make Montana especially
vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of
democracy and the republican form of government.”135
C. Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett
A year after Citizens United and one year prior to American Tradition
Partnership, albeit in a slightly different context within campaign
finance law, the Court rejected an opportunity to endorse a
democratically enacted public financing system in the case of Arizona
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.136 This time, it was not
the will of Congress that the justices were unilaterally rejecting, rather
the will of the rank-and-file voters of Arizona.137
Leading up to the decision, the idea of matching funds was generally
considered the single affirmative mechanism which “made public
financing politically and fiscally viable.”138 Supporters of public
financing maintain that public funds enable politicians to “focus more
on the interests of a broader cross section of the population,”139 work
towards shifting politician’s attention away from the elite, and
redevelop voter engagement in the process.140

132. Id. at 657.
133. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 517 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Erik Opsal, Supreme Court Lets Unlimited Money Stand, Ignores Extensive Record of
Corruption, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 25, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/
press-release/supreme-court-lets-unlimited-money-stand-ignores-extensive-recordcorruption [https://perma.cc/R2G4-B372?type=image].
135. W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 11 (Mont. 2011).
136. 564 U.S. 721 (2011).
137. Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (1998).
138. James Sample, The Last Rites of Public Campaign Financing?, 92 NEB. L. REV. 349,
351 (2013).
139. Id. at 362.
140. Id.
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However, the modern state of campaign financing made it so that a
candidate who opted for total public financing over private financing
was essentially a “sitting duck.”141 Thus, matching funds provisions were
appealing in that they allowed the government to “dispense limited
resources while allowing participating candidates to respond in races
where the most debate is generated,” instead of needlessly spending
money on low dollar races or noncompetitive races.142
In 1998, Arizona voters approved Proposition 200, the Arizona
Citizens Clean Elections Act.143 The act, inter alia, created a voluntary
public financing system, such that candidates for state office who
accepted public financing could receive additional money from the
State in direct response to the campaign activities of privately financed
candidates and independent expenditure groups.144 The system sought
to equalize campaign funding and strip disproportionate power away
from wealthy candidates and donors.145 Referred to as “trigger
matching funds,” the concept enabled a candidate to receive public
funding while not restricting their ability to raise money above the
public spending limit.146 Many advocates referred to this system as the
single “most effective tool ever enacted into law to induce candidates
to opt in to public campaign financing.”147
Despite the widespread appeal that the trigger matching funds
system garnered, the Arizona statute was challenged by a group of
Republican candidates and independent expenditure groups who
argued that the provision penalized their speech and burdened their
First Amendment rights.148 The candidates and independent
expenditure groups asserted that the “looming threat of trigger
matching funds” chilled their speech, an argument that was at least in
part derived from a previous Roberts Court decision in Davis v. FEC.149

141. Id. at 352.
142. Dagget v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445,
469 (1st Cir. 2000).
143. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 728 (2011).
144. Id. at 727–29. By opting in, a candidate had to agree to some modest restrictions, such
as a threshold number of contributions and a limit on personal expenditures. Id.
145. See id. at 729 (discussing when conditions for public financing are met,
candidates are granted additional equalizing funds).
146. Sample, supra note 138, at 384 (citing Richard Briffault, Davis v. FEC: The Roberts
Court Continuing Attack on Campaign Finance Reform, 44 TULSA L. REV. 475, 479 (2009)).
147. Michael Pernick, Making Arizona Free Enterprise Kick the Bucket: A New Path
Forward for Public Financing, 40 NYU R. L. & SOC. CHANGE 468, 472 (2015).
148. Free Enter., 564 U.S. at 733.
149. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
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In Davis, the Court held that spending limits which triggered matching
funds was a burden on free speech by discouraging candidates from
raising additional funds.150 However, the Court’s desire to invalidate
these laws on First Amendment grounds would fundamentally
“misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment’s protection of
[free] speech,” in that it would establish a First Amendment right in
outraising and outspending an opponent free from response.151
Leading up to Free Enterprise, courts of appeals had been largely
supportive of trigger matching funds.152 The First Circuit in the Daggett
v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices153 decision held
that there is no right to speak free from response and that “the purpose
of the First Amendment is to ‘secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’”154 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals forcefully wrote that matching funds provisions
placed no limitations or punishment on politicians who exceeded the
trigger limits and that their free speech was in no way infringed upon by
simply providing their opponent with the tools to respond.155
In Free Enterprise, the Arizona District Court granted an injunction
against enforcement of the Arizona matching funds provision. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that
any minimal burdens that the provision imposed on speech were
justified by the state’s compelling interest in reducing quid pro quo
corruption.156 The case then made its way to the Supreme Court, which
delivered yet another shocking blow to American democracy.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, which held
that the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act violated the First
Amendment as it utilized public funds to support a candidate who the
opposing candidate and their donors opposed.157 The majority’s

150. Sample, supra note 138, at 382 (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)). This
case also struck down any limits whatsoever on an individual candidate’s right to spend
as much money as they want on their own election, previously referred as the
“Millionaire’s Amendment.” Davis, 554 U.S. at 729, 743–44.
151. Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 464 (1st Cir. 2000).
152. Sample, supra note 138, at 385.
153. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
154. Id. at 464 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam))
(citations omitted).
155. N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524
F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir. 2008).
156. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 733–34 (2011).
157. Id. at 754–55.
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approach was controlled largely by the logic of Davis, which stated that
the matching funds system “imposes an unprecedented penalty on any
candidate who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right[s].”158 While
the majority recognized differences between the penalty imposed by the
matching funds provision and the penalty imposed by the law struck down in
Davis,159 the majority determined that the difference made the Arizona
provision more constitutionally problematic.160 The Court reasoned that the
matching funds provision penalized a candidate or independent
expenditure group who vigorously exercised their right to use funds to
finance campaign speech as it triggered a guaranteed financial payout to the
publicly funded candidate that the candidate or group directly opposed.161
The State of Arizona, the Clean Elections Institute, and the U.S.
government offered several arguments to justify the existence of any burdens
imposed by the provision, all of which the Court emphatically denied.162 Most
notably, the majority rejected Arizona’s interest in leveling the playing field
to justify any undue burdens on protected free speech.163 Chief Justice
Roberts opined that “in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a game”
and “[t]he First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when
it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered
interchange of ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.”164 The
majority completely negated the possibility of quid pro quo corruption or
the appearance thereof because the independent expenditures were not
formally coordinated with a candidate and the candidates and groups were
separated.165 Yet again completely rejecting a legislative attempt at
equalizing access to democracy.166

158. Id. at 736 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)).
159. Id. at 737. Davis concerned a First Amendment challenge to the Millionaire’s
Amendment of BCRA. Davis, 554 U.S. at 728. In Davis, the Court held that while the
provision of that Amendment did not impose an outright cap on a candidate’s
personal expenditures, the Amendment was still unconstitutional because it forced a
candidate to choose between the right to engage in political speech or to be subjected
to discriminatory fundraising limitations due to the fact that a candidate who chose to
spend $350,000 of his own money was forced to shoulder a burden because his choice
provided fundraising advantages to the candidate’s adversary. See id. at 736, 739, 744.
160. Free Enter., 564 U.S. at 737.
161. Id. at 738–39.
162. Id. at 740.
163. Id. at 749–51.
164. Id. at 750 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam))
(citations omitted).
165. Id. at 751.
166. See generally Sample, supra note 138 (asserting that any available options for
public campaign financing are “political non-starters”). An excellent article by Frank
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan defended the public financing
of elections as a potent mechanism that preserves the independence of
elected officials who are not beholden to the interests of wealthy
donors.167 The dissent rebuked the majority for conveying the matching
funds provision as a restraint on electoral speech as the statute did not
impose a ceiling on speech nor did it prevent anyone from speaking.168
The dissent contended that the petitioners were motivated by a desire
to quash the speech of others in order to have the field to themselves.169
Justice Kagan averred that the majority erred in holding that the
government substantially burdened speech, particularly because the
matching funds provision in fact promoted additional speech from
publicly financed candidates.170 The dissent concluded by exclaiming
that the state’s compelling interest in attacking corruption and the
appearance thereof in the state’s political system was on the “very face
of Arizona’s public financing statute,”171 and the majority’s personal
distaste for “level[ing] the playing field” did not constitute a viable
excuse to strike down the Arizona law.172
Just as in the post-Citizens United context, the Free Enterprise decision
unleashed a string of detrimental effects on our democratic system. In
the wake of the decision, trigger matching funds across the nation were
quickly eliminated, and certain states entirely repealed public
financing systems altogether.173 Conservative lawmakers also seized on
the opportunity to increase state-level contribution limits, removing
any remaining incentives for candidates to opt into running a publicly
financed campaign.174 Empirical evidence from Arizona demonstrates
how participation in publicly financed elections completely
transformed as a result of the Free Enterprise decision. In 2008, the year of
the last general election in Arizona to have the trigger matching funds
provision, sixty-seven percent of candidates participated in the public

Pasquale discusses a theory of democracy that requires the state to intervene and structure
more equalized access to the public forum. Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the
Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601.
167. Free Enter., 564 U.S. at 757 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 763.
169. Id. at 766.
170. Id. at 757.
171. Id. at 777.
172. Id. at 780 (citations omitted).
173. See generally Pernick, supra note 147 (outlining the impact of the Free Enterprise
decision in states nationwide).
174. Id. at 490.
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financing system.175 By 2014, three years after the decision, this number
dropped to a modest twenty-eight percent.176 As David Cantelme
contends, the 2014 election cycle revealed the significant impact that the
decision had on Arizona politics as “dark money” flowed into elections
and the state public funding system neared utter collapse.177
D. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
As part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA),178
Congress established aggregate limits on campaign contributions.179 In
doing so, Congress hoped to restore public confidence in the political
system.180 The limits increased over time and were amended by the
BCRA.181 The most recent limits capped contributions to candidates for
federal office at $48,600, and contributions to party committees at
$74,600.182 Plaintiff McCutcheon, a major Republican Party donor, brought
suit challenging the constitutionality of the aggregate limits.183
The Court previously addressed FECA campaign contribution limits in
Buckley v. Valeo. In that case, the Court held that the limits were constitutional
when aimed at protecting against quid pro quo corruption.184 Buckley also
held that aggregate campaign limits, then $25,000, were constitutional.185
Although the limits imposed a “modest restraint upon protected political
activity,” they were justified to prevent evasion of the individual donation
limit.186 For example, a donor could make unearmarked donations to
committees, which would then donate to a particular candidate.187 Thus, the
Buckley Court saw aggregate limits as no different than the individual limits.188

175. Id. at 491.
176. Id.
177. See Daniel J. Cantelme, Arizona Campaign Finance Laws Are Teetering, ARIZ. ATT’Y,
Mar. 2015, at 36–37.
178. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 591, 62 Stat. 719 (1972).
179. See id.; see also Jason M. Breslow, Supreme Court Strikes Down Limits on Campaign
Spending, PBS: FRONTLINE (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/
article/supreme-court-strikes-down-limits-on-campaign-spending
[https://perma.cc/X5UL-TQUJ] (noting that the limits at issue in McCutcheon v. FEC
were established in the wake of the Watergate scandal).
180. See Breslow, supra note 179.
181. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014).
182. Breslow, supra note 179.
183. Id.
184. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976)).
185. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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The McCutcheon Court, however, held that the aggregate limits
implicated significant First Amendment interests.189 Contributing
money to political candidates is one way people participate in
democracy, the Court held. Aggregate limits impose more than a mere
“modest restraint” on this right as they effectively penalize the
individual donor who wishes to contribute to multiple candidates, so
this donor might have to give less than he wishes to certain candidates
to comply with the limit.190
Under McCutcheon, Congress may only suppress campaign speech to
target quid pro quo corruption. The Court acknowledged that the line
between quid pro quo corruption and general influence can be blurry.191
However, it rejected the idea that aggregate limits target such
corruption.192 Furthermore, the Court held that Congress may not suppress
campaign speech to equalize the electoral opportunities or financial
resources of candidates.193 McCutcheon, therefore, reemphasized the
holding in Free Enterprise.
McCutcheon did leave in place limits on contributions to an individual
candidate.194 However, the decision dramatically increased the amount of
money that a donor can contribute during an election cycle. Previously,
aggregate limits capped total contributions at approximately $123,000.195
Few people met this limit.196 During the 2012 election, only 644 people
nationwide hit the aggregate limit.197 However, with the removal of
aggregate limits and only the cap on individual contributions remaining,
the total amount an individual can contribute during a campaign cycle
increased to over $2.4 million.198 Therefore, the McCutcheon decision
benefitted an extremely small bloc of American political donors.

189. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 203.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 210.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 207. Adam Lamparello contends, however, that the limits at issue did not
reflect a Congressional attempt to merely level the playing field. Instead, he argues,
Congress was really trying to maintain the integrity of the entire system. Adam
Lamparello, Citizens Disunited: McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 90 IND.
L.J. SUPPLEMENT 43, 47 (2014).
194. Breslow, supra note 179.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Bob Biersack, McCutcheon Decision: Add Some More Zeroes to That Check, OPENSECRETS
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/04/mccutcheon-decisionadd-some-more-z [https://perma.cc/3TX5-6NX9].
198. Id.
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Adam Lamparello notes that the First Amendment is silent on campaign
finance issues, including aggregate limits.199 He contends, therefore, that the
Court should have taken a “pragmatic approach” and deferred to Congress’s
judgment that such limits were necessary.200 He also argues that the Court
could have upheld aggregate limits under a “time, place, and manner” type
regime.201 Unfortunately, like the other cases discussed in this Article, the
Court refused to defer to Congressional judgment.
There is a nontrivial possibility that the Supreme Court will
eventually strike down all campaign contribution limits. At least one
justice supports this view. Justice Thomas, concurring in McCutcheon,
argued that Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled in its entirety and that
all campaign contribution limits violate the First Amendment.202
Following McCutcheon, it is inevitable that the crux of Buckley, the
constitutionality of the limit on contributions to political candidates,
will come before the Court.203
This is far from mere speculation. Paul Clement is currently petitioning
the Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Thompson v. Hebdon.204
That decision upheld Alaska’s $500 limit on campaign contributions.205
Clement argues that the limit is too low.206 If the Court grants certiorari
and reverses the Ninth Circuit’s decision, it would “hasten a world in
which individuals could give unlimited sums directly to candidates, buying
all the ingratiation and access they want.”207
Clement’s concern is warranted in light of the Court’s previous
decisions and recent Trump appointments to the bench. As of September
2019, 150 Trump appointees had been confirmed to the federal judiciary,
including Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, who have expressed

199. Lamparello, supra note 193, at 43.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 48.
202. Id. at 44. This view also finds support from James Bopp Jr. and Randy Elf,
advocates for more campaign spending. See James Bopp Jr. et al., Contribution Limits
After McCutcheon v. FEC, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (2015).
203. The Editorial Bd., The Court Follows the Money, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/the-court-follows-the-money.html
(questioning whether the Court would uphold the constitutionality of per-candidate
limits after its decision in McCutcheon).
204. Richard L. Hasen, Unlimited Donations to Candidates, Coming Soon?, ATLANTIC
(July 26, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/campaignfinance-supreme-court/594751.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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considerable hostility towards campaign finance regulations.208 These
Justices are likely to team up with Chief Justice Roberts, who equated
the right to donate money with the right to vote in the McCutcheon
decision.209 Certainly, the current conservative majority will further
campaign finance deregulation.210
As Justice Breyer lamented in his dissent, McCutcheon
is a decision that substitutes judges’ understandings of how the political
process works for the understanding of Congress; that fails to recognize
the difference between influence resting upon public opinion and
influence bought by money alone; that overturns key precedent; that
creates huge loopholes in the law; and that undermines, perhaps
devastates, what remains of campaign finance reform.211

On the other hand, defenders of McCutcheon contend that the decision
enables greater contributions to party committees, which soaks up some of
the spending that was going to outside groups.212 Under this rather cynical
view of campaign finance, the flow of big money must go somewhere, so it
may as well go to the more well-known entity. However, as Michael Kang
argues, this simply leads to “party-based” corruption rather than individual
corruption.213 Under this theory, the parties act as wide networks through
which large donations are filtered.214 While quid pro quo corruption still
occurs, it becomes more attenuated and difficult to prove.215
These campaign finance decisions have increased the concentration of
political power in the rich and powerful. As Stephen Feldman argues, the
Roberts Court has turned American democracy into “Democracy, Inc.”216
This Court has been the most probusiness since World War II, favoring
corporations even when evidence proves it harmful to the representationreinforcing values central to the democratic system and ultimately
undermining the confidence of the American people in the political system.
208. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Trump’s Judicial Picks Are Gutting Campaign Finance Law,
LAW 360 (Sept. 12, 2019, 8:04 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1195
479/trump-s-judicial-picks-are-gutting-campaign-finance-law.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 260–61 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. Bopp et al., supra note 202, at 386; see also Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon,
After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 373, 374 (2014); Robert Kelner, The Practical
Consequences of McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 380, 384 (2014).
213. Michael Kang, Party-Based Corruption and McCutcheon v. FEC, 108 NW. L. REV.
ONLINE 240, 241–42 (2014).
214. Id. at 242.
215. Id.
216. Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Constitutionalism
Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 267 (2015).
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E. McDonnell v. United States
One of the threads that ties the Court’s decisions in Citizens United v.
FEC, Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, and McCutcheon v. FEC together is the
majority’s perfunctory invalidation of statutes targeted at the scourge of
quid pro quo corruption that has plagued our democratic institutions.
The Court was again provided with the opportunity to admonish quid pro
quo corruption in the context of a high-profile gubernatorial bribery
charge in McDonnell v. United States.217 However, the Court refused to
acknowledge the existence of this blatant corruption, delivering yet
another shocking blow to the efficacy of our democracy.218
At issue in McDonnell was the proper interpretation of the federal
bribery statute 18 U.S.C. § 201. The federal bribery statute was enacted
in 1962 to strengthen criminal laws on bribery, graft, and conflicts of
interest.219 The extensive legislative history behind the 1962 bill reveals that
both Congress and President John F. Kennedy sought to pass the law in order
to raise ethical standards and increase public confidence in government.220
18 U.S.C. § 201 makes it a crime for a public official to directly or
indirectly corruptly demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree “to receive
or accept anything of value” in exchange for “being influenced in the
performance of any official act.”221 For purposes of the statute, an
“official act” is defined as “any decision or action on any question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending,
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”222
The interpretation of this statute became relevant in 2009, when
Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife began their interactions with
businessman Jonnie Williams during McDonnell’s gubernatorial
campaign.223 From the onset of his campaign, Governor McDonnell
focused heavily on promoting business and fostering economic
development in Virginia.224 This caught the attention of Jonnie
Williams, the CEO of a Virginia-based company, Star Scientific.

217. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
218. See id. at 2372.
219. See ARNOLD & PORTER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF BRIBERY, GRAFT, AND CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST (18 U.S.C. 201 ET SEQ.) P.L. 87-849, https://heinonline.org/HOL
/P?h=hein.leghis/gihiscoter0001&i=1&a=YW1lcmljYW4uZWR1.
220. Id.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012).
222. § 201(a)(3).
223. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361–62, 2365.
224. Id. at 2361.

1588

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1559

Williams wanted local universities to perform research on the
nutritional supplement, Anatabloc, to determine its health benefits and
ultimately obtain FDA approval of Anatabloc as an anti-inflammatory
drug.225 In exchange for help in advancing this agenda, Williams entered
into a close relationship with McDonnell in that he provided monetary
loans and other benefits to McDonnell to help him through his financial
struggles.226 In return for this monetary assistance, Governor McDonnell
set up meetings for Williams with state agencies, held luncheons with
university researchers, and even suggested that Anatabloc be included in
state employees’ healthcare plans.227
The scope of the financial assistance increased significantly as Williams
provided McDonnell and his wife with various gifts, including shopping
sprees, expensive vacations, designer watches, and a loan to help with their
daughter’s wedding.228 By the end of their relationship, Williams gave
$175,000 to the McDonnells in loans, gifts, and other benefits.229
In January of 2014, federal prosecutors indicted McDonnell and his
wife on federal bribery charges while Williams received immunity in
exchange for his testimony.230 To convict the McDonnells, it was
incumbent on the government to prove the Governor committed, or
agreed to commit, an “official act” in exchange for financial benefit
like the gifts and loans Williams provided.231 The government cited at
least five instances in which the Governor committed an “official act”
for Williams, including hosting events, arranging meetings, and
contacting government officials on his behalf.232
Controversy arose surrounding how the jury would be instructed as to
what constituted an “official act” under the statute.233 The district court
instructed the jury according to the government’s understanding of an
“official act.”234 In order to convict McDonnell using the government’s
definition, he would have had to agree to “accept a thing of value in
exchange for official action.”235 However, McDonnell’s defense team
225. Id. at 2362.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2362–64.
228. Id. at 2362–63.
229. Id. at 2364.
230. Id. at 2364–66.
231. Id. at 2365.
232. Id. at 2365–66.
233. Id. at 2366.
234. Id.
235. Id. The Court informed the jury that the statutory definition of “official act”
“encompassed ‘acts that a public official customarily performs,’ including acts ‘in
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objected to this instruction, arguing that merely arranging an event or a
meeting, standing alone, is not an “official act.”236 McDonnell’s team
furthered its argument by explaining that “official acts” should relate to a
specific gubernatorial decision, enumerating issuing a license, awarding a
contract, passing a law, or implementing a regulation.237
The Supreme Court—in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice
Roberts—ruled that the government’s interpretation of an “official act” was
too broad as it encompassed nearly “any decision or action, on any question
or matter” that is pending at any time or can be brought before any public
official.238 According to the Court, a more circumscribed interpretation was
necessary.239 The Court averred that the proper interpretation of an
“official act” is a decision or action on a “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy. The ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding
or controversy’ must involve a formal exercise of governmental power . . . .
[i]t must also be something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may
by law be brought’ before a public official.”240 Under this “proper”
definition, the Court concluded that merely setting up a meeting, hosting
an event, or calling another official is not a decision or action on any
of the questions or matters before the Court.241
The Court also contemplated the constitutional concerns that the
government’s interpretation of “official act” raised.242 The Court
proffered that under the government’s overly broad interpretation,
nearly anything a public official did would count as a quid pro quo.243
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the government’s interpretation
could “cast a pall of potential prosecution” over day-to-day relationships
between conscientious public officials and their constituents.244 The
furtherance of longer-term goals’ or ‘in a series of steps to exercise influence or
achieve an end.’” Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2367–68.
239. Id. at 2368.
240. Id. at 2372.
241. Id. at 2370. The Court agreed with the determination of the Fourth Circuit
that there were three questions or matters at issue in the case including “(1) ‘whether
researchers at any of Virginia’s state universities would initiate a study of Anatabloc’;
(2) ‘whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and Community
Revitalization Commission’ would ‘allocate grant money for the study of anatabine’;
and (3) ‘whether the health insurance plan for state employees in Virginia would
include Anatabloc as a covered drug.’” Id.
242. Id. at 2372.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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Court feared such a situation would cause officials and citizens alike to
refrain from participating in democratic discourse and chill interactions
that are typical in a representative government.245
Yet, it is hard to reconcile the fact that the Court unanimously
recognized $175,000 in gifts and loans from Williams to the McDonnell
family as a “normal” constituent relationship under a representative
government.246 This appears to be an utter failure by the Court to fully
gauge the difference between normal day-to-day constituent services
and the totality of the conduct by Governor McDonnell, which clearly
amounted to quid pro quo corruption.
The result of the McDonnell decision was a collective sigh of relief from
lobbyists and anticampaign regulation activists.247 While there was some
disagreement as to how far the decision would reach, it was universally agreed
that McDonnell was a further relaxation of rules for lobbyists and politicians.248
Certain scholars concurred with the Court’s conclusion that the link between
the gifts given to the Governor and his undertaking of an “official act” was
tenuous.249 Yet, others saw the McDonnell decision for what it was—another
judicial step that eroded institutions intrinsic to representative democracy. As
the leader of one watchdog group bemoaned, “the repercussions are
massive. . . [t]his case was a critical test, and the [C]ourt failed.”250
II. VOTING RIGHTS
The Court’s undermining of representation-reinforcing values during
the decade was definitely not limited to the campaign finance arena. The
Court struck a brutal blow to voting rights in Shelby County v. Holder and a
lesser, but still significant, one in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute.
Then, as the decade of democracy’s demise neared its conclusion, the
Court shut the doors of federal courts to partisan gerrymandering claims
in Rucho v. Common Cause. In isolation, each of these decisions
undermines voting rights. In the aggregate, they are a democratic disaster.

245. Id.
246. Id. at 2364.
247. Kate Ackley, Campaign Finance Watchdogs Decry McDonnell Corruption Ruling,
ROLL CALL (June 27, 2016, 3:53 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/
campaign-finance-watchdogs-decry-mcdonnell-corruption-ruling
[https://perma.cc/3GSS-N6PX].
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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In 1965, Congress passed the landmark Voting Rights Act (VRA)251 in
response to the segregationist era voter suppression tactics that remained
as the influence of Jim Crow began to recede through the South.252 The Act
required covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance from federal authorities
prior to changing their voting procedures.253 The Supreme Court has
described a covered jurisdiction as “those States or political subdivisions
that had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of
November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or
turnout in the 1964 Presidential Election.”254 This encompassed the
entirety of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Virginia, as well as scattered counties throughout the country.255
The preclearance provision required a covered jurisdiction to obtain
permission from federal authorities, either the D.C. District Court or
the U.S. Attorney General’s Office, before making any changes to
voting procedures.256 In seeking preclearance, a covered jurisdiction
had the burden to show that the change in voting procedure had
“neither ‘the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.’”257 The Court first upheld
the VRA in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.258 In that decision, the Court
ruled that the VRA was justified to address “voting discrimination
where it persists on a pervasive scale.”259 Nearly forty-five years later, the
Court once again faced the issue of whether to uphold the VRA.

251. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
252. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309–15 (1966) (summarizing
the legislative history behind the VRA, which documented the various kinds of
legislative devices and tests used throughout the South to disenfranchise blacks, and
stating that the VRA intended to eliminate racial discrimination from voting).
253. See Voting Rights Act § 5.
254. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (2013).
255. Id. at 537 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2012)).
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. at 439).
258. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
259. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 538 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308).
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A. Shelby County v. Holder
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sought a declaratory judgment that the
coverage formula and preclearance requirement were unconstitutional
and sought a permanent injunction against their enforcement.260 The
statute was upheld by both the District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals before landing at the Supreme Court.261
In a sweeping decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court ruled
that the VRA’s coverage formula was unconstitutional.262 The Court first
cited its decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v.
Holder,263 where it expressed doubt about the coverage formula’s
constitutionality in holding that “[a statute’s] current burdens must be
justified by current needs . . . . [and any] disparate geographic
coverage [must be] sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets.”264 The Court then cited to facts that voter registration and
turnout had more or less reached parity between blacks and whites in
2006, that blacks were being elected to office in record numbers, and
that black turnout even exceeded white turnout in five of the six
covered states.265 Thus, the Court opined that the coverage formula
violated the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the
States” because covered jurisdictions had to “beseech the Federal
Government for permission to implement laws that they would
otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own.”266
Central to the Court’s decision in Shelby County was its belief that
“[o]ur country has changed,” thus rendering the coverage formula
outdated and unnecessary.267 Counsel for Shelby County echoed this
260. Id. at 540–41.
261. Id.
262. The Court’s four other conservative justices joined in the majority.
263. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
264. Id. at 203.
265. Id. at 547–48.
266. Id. at 544. For a discussion on the problematic roots of the “equal sovereignty
principle,” see generally James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal
Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 39 (2014). The authors argue that the equal sovereignty principle has
its roots in Dred Scott and was reaffirmed in the Slaughter-House Cases. Id. at 41–42, 47,
55. The Shelby County Court, of course, does not cite to these cases—but “[s]urely the
Court had to be aware of the racially discriminatory origins of its ‘equal sovereignty’
doctrine.” Id. at 58.
267. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 557 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court reasoned that
because the coverage formula was “based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation
to the present day,” and thus was “not . . . grounded in current conditions.” Id. at 554
(majority opinion). In addition, in reference to the aforementioned House report, the
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sentiment by arguing that “the problem to which the Voting Rights Act
was addressed is solved. You look at the registration, you look at the voting.
That problem is solved on an absolute, as well as, a relative basis.”268 Justice
Kagan pointed out the fundamental flaw in this argument by asking,
“[y]ou said the problem has been solved. But who gets to make that
judgment really? Is it you, is it the Court, or is it Congress?”269
The extensive legislative history of the VRA and its subsequent
reauthorization underscores why the Court should have deferred to
Congressional judgment here. The VRA was reauthorized by Congress
three times between its initial passage and 2006, when the VRA was
extended for another twenty-five years.270 When the VRA came back up for
reauthorization in 2006, Congress compiled a record with over 12,000
pages of evidence as to why the VRA needed to be reauthorized along with
the same coverage formula.271 The report, completed by the House
Judiciary Committee, found that preclearance of covered jurisdictions had
been a “vital prophylactic tool[] . . . [against new efforts] employed by
covered . . . jurisdictions.”272 The report also found that since the previous
authorization in 1982, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had objected to
over 700 changes in voting laws that were determined to be
discriminatory.273 In fact, there were more objections to voting changes
between 1982 and 2004 than between 1965 and 1982.274
Even the mere threat of preclearance was an effective deterrent
against jurisdictions considering discriminatory changes. The DOJ,
when it suspected a discriminatory motive, would send the jurisdiction

Court said that “no one can fairly say that [the record] shows anything approaching
the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced
Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest
of the Nation at that time.” Id.
268. Transcript of Oral Argument at 65–66, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013) (No. 12–96).
269. Id. at 66.
270. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 536–39.
271. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 5 (2006). Congress clearly recognized the
importance of this legislation because it “result[ed] from the development of one of
the most extensive legislative records in the Committee on the Judiciary’s history.” Id.
The investigation included ten oversight hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution which had oral testimony from thirty-nine witnesses, additional written
testimony from the Department of Justice, government and nongovernmental
organizations, and private citizens, and incorporated two comprehensive reports
compiled by nongovernmental organizations. Id.
272. Id. at 21.
273. Id. at 36.
274. Id. at 6, 21.
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a “More Information Request” (“MIR”).275 Since the 1982
reauthorization, covered jurisdictions withdrew over 205 proposed
voting changes after receiving an MIR.276 The report found that racial
disparities in voter turnout and elected officials persisted in covered
jurisdictions but that the preclearance provision was the direct cause
of an increase in both turnout and the election of African American
officials.277 On the heels of this report, Congress passed the 2006
reauthorization with overwhelming bipartisan support: the Senate
passed it 98–0; the House passed it 390–33; and Republican President
George W. Bush enthusiastically signed it into law.278
The Court emphasized the rigidity of a coverage formula that forced
covered jurisdictions to “beseech the Federal Government for
permission” to change their voting procedures.279 The Court, however,
overlooked the flexibility afforded to covered jurisdictions through the
“bailout” procedure. A covered jurisdiction that showed its compliance
with the VRA for the previous ten years could lose its covered status.280
The bailout provisions reflected Congress’s concern about subjecting
jurisdictions to preclearance for extended periods of time.281 In
reauthorizing the VRA in 1982, Congress expected that covered
jurisdictions would take advantage of the bailout provision and that “few
jurisdictions would remain covered 25 years later.”282 By 2006, eleven
counties from Virginia successfully bailed out from covered status, thus
demonstrating that “covered status is neither permanent nor over-broad”

275. Id. at 40. MIRs forced covered jurisdictions to either “(1) submit additional
information to prove a change is non-discriminatory; (2) withdraw a proposed change
from consideration because it is discriminatory; (3) submit a new or amended nondiscriminatory voting plan; or (4) make no change.” Id. at 40.
276. Id. at 41.
277. Id. at 12.
278. Press Release, The White House: President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/200607271.html [https://perma.cc/C77E-5WUJ]. “At least 13 laws were blocked by
preclearance in just the 18 months prior to” the Shelby County decision. Max Feldman,
A Chance to Revive the Voting Rights Act, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/chance-revive-votingrights-act [https://perma.cc/54F7-ARLE].
279. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
280. Id. at 539.
281. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 10 (2006). In the 1982 reauthorization, Congress
amended the bailout provision “to allow a political subdivision to terminate coverage
independent of a covered State.” Id.
282. Id.

2020]

THE DECADE OF DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE

1595

and that covered status is “within the control of the jurisdiction . . . .”283
However, Congress was “disappointed” that more States did not take
advantage of the bailout process over that twenty-five-year span.284
Congress found that the lack of successful bailouts was “telling of the
commitment by some of the covered jurisdictions to end discriminatory
practices.”285 Thus, the Court’s portrayal of the coverage formula as
“static, unchanged since 1965” is inaccurate.286 Liberalized bailout
procedures allowed covered jurisdictions to control their own destiny.
The fact that so many jurisdictions were unable to bail out “reinforces the
congressional judgment that these jurisdictions were rightfully subject to
preclearance, and ought to remain under that regime.”287
Professor Ellen Katz defended the coverage formula and criticized the
Court’s following statement: “if ‘Congress had started from scratch in
2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage
formula . . . . [but] that is exactly what Congress has done.’”288 To the
contrary, Professor Katz argues that “Congress was not starting from
scratch in 2006. Instead, it was considering whether a remedy everyone
agreed had been lawfully imposed should continue.”289 Congress
concluded, based on the evidence it had compiled, that the coverage
formula and preclearance were still necessary.290 Reauthorization of
the VRA preserved the “opportunities to refine coverage through the
bailout and bail-in procedures.”291
The majority argued that “first-generation” barriers to voting (i.e., literacy
tests, other devices that block ballot access) have largely been eliminated.292
Therefore, “current conditions” in the covered states did not justify the
coverage formula.293 The presence of “second-generation barriers” (which
“affect the weight of minority votes”) does not “cure” the problem of the
coverage formula, according to the majority opinion.294

283. Id. at 25.
284. Id. at 58.
285. Id.
286. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 580 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
287. Id.
288. Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 329, 330 (2013)
(quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 556).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 547).
293. Id. (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 553).
294. Id. at 331 (quoting Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 554).
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Katz contends, however, that the VRA was always intended to prevent
second-generation barriers. Second-generation practices, such as
racial gerrymandering, “predate the VRA by decades.”295 Southern
states used second-generation barriers in conjunction with firstgeneration barriers throughout the Jim Crow era.296 Therefore, “the
practices grouped as ‘second generation’ are not unrelated to the
concerns that first animated Congress to enact the VRA. They were part
and parcel of the practices the original statute targeted.”297 The coverage
formula used lower voter turnout tests and devices as a “trigger” for
preclearance.298 However, these “elements” “captured with remarkable
accuracy” places in the South that also engaged in “second-generation”
barriers to voting.299 “The statutory ‘trigger’ linked tests and devices to
low participation, but the statute’s target was never so limited.”300
The majority opinion “may signal deeper skepticism about
congressional judgment” and “portend more rigorous examination of
congressional action in the future.”301
Wendy Scott argues that while Shelby County may have provoked an
outcry, the decision was actually foreseeable.302 She points out that
southern states actively circumvented the VRA throughout the Act’s
history.303 States used “reapportionment, annexation,” “at-large voting
schemes,” and “outright defiance of federal authority” to disenfranchise
black voters.304 Some local officials have even “closed their registration
offices to freeze the voting rolls.”305 Nonetheless, the Court often reacted
to these practices with “ambivalence.”306 For example, in Allen v. State
Board of Elections,307 Mississippi changed its voting procedures to
discriminate against African-American voters but did not seek
preclearance.308 The Court held that Mississippi did need to seek

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Wendy B. Scott, Reflections on Justice Thurgood Marshall and Shelby County v.
Holder, 76 LA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2015).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 131.
305. Id. at 132 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966)).
306. Id. at 125.
307. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
308. Scott, supra note 302, at 132; see also Allen, 393 U.S. at 571.
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preclearance and did not order new elections.309 This left officials
elected through an illegal voting scheme in power and advantaged by
the benefits of incumbency.310
In another example, the Court upheld a Virginia reapportionment plan
that diluted minority voting strength because the population variances were
“unavoidable.”311 The Court also upheld the City of Richmond’s annexation
scheme under the VRA, which diluted minority voting strength.312 In City of
Mobile v. Bolden,313 the Court upheld Mobile, Alabama’s at-large voting law.314
A group of black voters challenged the law under the VRA, but the Court
held that “‘political groups’ have no ‘constitutional claim to representation’
independent from ‘the right of a person to vote on an equal basis.’”315 Justice
Marshall’s dissent noted that the at-large system “submerg[ed] electoral
minorities and overrepresent[ed] electoral majorities.”316
Another way Shelby County was foreseeable, according to Wendy Scott, was
the Court’s imposition of “high standards for proving racial
discrimination.”317 In Beer v. United States,318 the Court held that a plan
violated the VRA if it led to a “retrogression in the position of racial
minorities,” as compared with the existing plan.319 As Justice Marshall
noted in his dissent, Congress enacted the VRA to prevent new voting
plans that “perpetuate discrimination,” not to simply prevent existing
discrimination from worsening.320
Scott argues Shelby County is also unsurprising considering the
Roberts Court’s commitment to “post-racial constitutionalism,” under
which minorities no longer need to be protected from racial
discrimination.321 Shelby County falls squarely within this tradition by
holding that the “conditions that originally justified [the VRA coverage
formula and preclearance] no longer characterize voting in the
covered jurisdictions.”322

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Scott, supra note 302, at 132; see also Allen, 393 U.S. at 572.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 572 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Scott, supra note 302, at 134 (discussing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)).
Id. at 135 (discussing City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Id. at 78.
Scott, supra note 302, at 137 (quoting City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 78).
Id. (quoting City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 138.
425 U.S. 130 (1976).
Scott, supra note 302, at 139 (citing Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
Id. (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 124–25, 144, 145.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 535 (2013).
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The conservative Justices echoed this sentiment during oral
argument. Justice Scalia notoriously referred to the VRA as an example
of “racial entitlement,” pointing out that “[t]here are certain districts
in the House that are black districts by law just about now.”323 Racial
entitlements, Scalia contended, are difficult to eliminate “through the
normal political processes” once the entitlements are no longer
needed.324 Kennedy, who sided with the conservative bloc, acknowledged
that the coverage formula was upheld as rational and effective in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach in 1966.325 However, “the Marshall Plan was very
good, too, the Morrill Act, the Northwest Ordinance, but times change,”
he argued.326 Counsel for Shelby County boldly claimed that “the
problem to which the Voting Rights Act was addressed is solved. You
look at the registration, you look at the voting. That problem is solved
on an absolute, as well as, a relative basis.”327 The Court, by adopting
this post-racial argument, “seemingly embraced the Plessy v. Ferguson
concept that the continued existence of racism is a construct of the
African-American imagination.”328
Not everyone laments the Court’s holding.329 Cato Institute Director
Ilya Shapiro contends that the Shelby County decision “underlines,
belatedly, that Jim Crow is dead, and that American election law is
ready to return to normalcy.”330 He argues that prior to the decision,
the “widespread, official racial discrimination in voting ha[d]
disappeared,” because the institutionalized and sanctioned racial
discrimination was no longer in place throughout the country.331 He
criticizes the “media and political elites” for suggesting otherwise and
for focusing energy on the Court’s decision.332 He contends that
because there is no overt act of disenfranchisement, there is no need
for efforts to prevent “[r]acial discrimination in voting.”333
323. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)
(No. 12-96).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 35.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 65–66. Justice Kagan replied, “You said the problem has been solved. But who
gets to make that judgment really? Is it you, is it the Court, or is it Congress?” Id. at 66.
328. Scott, supra note 302, at 145.
329. See Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County and the Vindication of Martin Luther King’s Dream,
8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 182, 191 (2013).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 192.
332. Id. at 185.
333. See id. at 188. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on
Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 104 (2013). Professor Issacharoff singles out “partisan
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However, empirical data suggest that the coverage formula was, contrary
to the majority’s holding and Shapiro’s analysis, “justified by ‘current
needs.’”334 The Brennan Center for Justice found that previously covered
jurisdictions “have engaged in recent, significant efforts to disenfranchise
voters.”335 These jurisdictions have succeeded in enacting laws that restrict
voting.336 Overall, Shelby County has had a “profound and negative impact”
on voter participation in previously covered jurisdictions.337
The Court in Shelby County only formally addressed the coverage
formula and did not issue a holding on the preclearance requirement.
However, without the coverage formula, section 5 is essentially a
nullity. Thus, Shelby County “crippled” the VRA, and invited previously
covered jurisdictions to “implement[] changes to voting practices that
would have otherwise required preclearance.”338 The effects were
immediately felt.339 Previously covered jurisdictions enacted voter
identification laws, even in the absence of evidence of voter fraud.340
Some localities limited early voting and certain polling locations.341

battleground states such as Colorado, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania,” as noncovered
jurisdictions that “sought to implement restrictive voter access laws.” Id. at 104.
Furthermore, “[t]he likelihood that a state would have introduced restrictive voter
identification laws in recent years turns on one variable: Republican control of the
state legislature.” Id. at 103.
334. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550–51 (2013) (quoting N.W. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 198, 203 (2009)); see also The Effects of Shelby
County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.brennancenter
.org/analysis/effects-shelby-county-v-holder [https://perma.cc/S2TT-JYE4].
335. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 334.
336. Id.
337. JONATHAN BRATER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., PURGES: A GROWING THREAT
TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE 1 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/2019-08/Report_Purges_Growing_Threat.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2WT-ELL9].
338. Scott, supra note 302, at 123.
339. Id.
340. See id. For example, “[w]ithin 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced that it
would implement a strict photo ID law.” The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note
334; see also Rick Lyman, Texas’ Stringent Voter ID Law Makes a Dent at Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/politics/texas-stringent-voter-id-lawmakes-a-dent-at-polls.html?_r=0%20 (discussing the Texas voter ID law, although federal
courts would eventually strike down this law as discriminatory). But see Max Feldman, Voting
Rights in America, Six Years after Shelby v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 25, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/voting-rights-america-six-years-after-shelby-vholder [https://perma.cc/LC7Q-2ZR9] (noting that states including Alabama and
Mississippi implemented photo ID laws, which had been previously barred due to
federal preclearance; although other state laws, including Texas’, have been
successfully challenged, not all state laws have been).
341. Scott, supra note 302, at 124.
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North Carolina, for example, enacted an extremely restrictive voting
bill only two months after the Shelby County decision. The bill required a
photo ID to vote, limited early voting, “eliminated same day registration;
restricted pre-registration; ended annual voter registration drives; and
eliminated the authority of county boards of elections to keep polls open
for an additional hour.”342 The Fourth Circuit struck this law down three
years later under section 2 of the VRA.343 However, this three-year delay
highlights the important function that preclearance served: “shift[ing] the
benefit of time and inertia from the perpetrators of evil to the victim.”344
Without preclearance, illegal voting laws like North Carolina’s can take
effect for years before a court strikes them down under section 2.345 Of
course, there is no guarantee that a court will even strike down such illegal
voting laws under section 2, notwithstanding the “expensive and
protracted” nature of the litigation to reach that junction.346
Following Shelby County, voter suppression laws have left their mark
on electoral outcomes. During the 2016 election, fourteen states had
new voting restrictions in place for the first time.347 Reports suggest
that the voter ID law in Wisconsin prevented nearly 45,000 people from
voting.348 President Trump won the state by only 22,177 votes.349
Milwaukee, a majority African American city, saw its voter turnout
decrease by nearly 41,000 people.350
342. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 334.
343. Id.
344. H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 328 (1966)).
345. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Shelby County dissent, this allows politicians
elected under “illegal voting scheme[s],” to “gain[] the advantages of incumbency.”
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S., 529, 572 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
346. Scott, supra note 302, at 124; see also Feldman, supra note 278.
347. New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/new-voting-restrictions-america
[https://perma.cc/XW85-X8TS]. New restrictions on the right to vote impacted
Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
348. Ari Berman, Rigged: How Voter Suppression Threw Wisconsin to Trump, MOTHER
JONES (Nov.-Dec. 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/votersuppression-wisconsin-election-2016 [https://perma.cc/6TLM-R8EG].
349. Brooke Seipel, Trump’s Victory Margin Smaller than Total Stein Votes in Key Swing
States, HILL (Dec. 1, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/
308353-trump-won-by-smaller-margin-than-stein-votes-in-all-three
[https://perma.cc/HTQ6-HU5L].
350. Berman, supra note 348. Some blamed Hillary Clinton’s loss in Wisconsin on
her “failure to campaign in the state,” or the populace’s “lack of enthusiasm” about
her campaign in general. Id.
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Previously covered jurisdictions have leapt at the chance to close
polling locations.351 Arizona closed 212 locations.352 Texas closed 403.353
In total, previously covered jurisdictions closed 868 polling locations in
time for the 2016 election.354
States also purged voters from voting rolls in record numbers following
Shelby County.355 Between 2014 and 2016, states removed nearly sixteen
million voters from the rolls—four million more than before the 2008
election.356 Between 2016 and 2018, an additional seventeen million voters
were purged from the rolls.357 Previously covered states purged voters at
much higher rates than noncovered states.358 The Brennan Center calculates
that between 2012 and 2016, “2 million fewer voters would have been purged”
if previously covered jurisdictions purged at the same rate as noncovered
jurisdictions.359 This trend has continued into 2018360 and 2019.361
351. See, e.g., Zak Cheney-Rice, Georgia Republicans Secure Another Victory in Their Voter
Purge, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 30, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/georgiarepublicans-voter-purge.html [https://perma.cc/V6NF-2VZR] (describing Georgia
polling place closures). In the six years prior to the 2018 election, Georgia eliminated
or relocated almost half of the state’s polling locations. Id. The impacts of the “closures
and relocations” had a disproportionate impact and “were 20 percent more likely to
be prohibitive for black voters than their white counterparts.” Id. (citing Mark Niesse
& Nick Thieme, Precinct Closures Harm Voter Turnout in Georgia, AJC Analysis Finds,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-politics/precinct-closures-harm-voter-turnout-georgia-ajc-analysis-finds/11sVcLyQCH
uQRC8qtZ6lYP [https://perma.cc/LN5U-T66T]); see also Ari Berman, There Are 868
Fewer Places to Vote in 2016 Because the Supreme Court Gutted the Voting Rights Act, NATION
(Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/there-are-868-fewer-places-tovote-in-2016-because-the-supreme-court-gutted-the-voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/F79K-L2RG].
352. Berman, supra note 351.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. BRATER ET AL., supra note 337, at 1.
356. Joe Davidson, Almost 16 Million Voters Were Removed from the Rolls. We Should Be
Alarmed, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
almost-16-million-voters-were-removed-from-the-rolls-we-should-be-alarmed/2019/
05/15/f3de396a-7682-11e9-bd25-c989555e7766_story.html.
357. Kevin Morris, Voter Purge Rates Remain High, Analysis Finds, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/voter-purge-rates-remainhigh-analysis-finds [https://perma.cc/J7FE-T63Y].
358. BRATER ET AL., supra note 337, at 1.
359. Id.
360. Morris, supra note 357. Up to 1.1 million fewer voters would have been purged
between 2016 and 2018 if all counties purged voter rolls at the same rate. Id. Previously
covered jurisdictions purge at a forty percent higher rate than noncovered jurisdictions. Id.
361. Cheney-Rice, supra note 351. On December 16, 2019, Georgia purged 300,000
voters from the rolls. Id. Fair Fight Georgia, a group formed by former Georgia
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Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Fifteenth Amendment is “not
designed to punish for the past.”362 The coverage formula, in his estimation,
did precisely that because it failed to reflect “current conditions.”363 To the
contrary, data suggest what Congress knew when it reauthorized the VRA
was that “current conditions” justified the continued use of the coverage
formula. The millions of now disenfranchised voters in previously covered
jurisdictions reflect this sad reality.364
B. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute
Faced with an antiparticipatory policy, the Supreme Court found its
way back to legislative deference in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute.
Coincidence? Causation? The answer is impossible to prove, but as
against the trend of aggressive judicial fact finding in the cases
examined above, failing to at least acknowledge the correlation is the
equivalent of putting one’s head in the sand.
Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)365 to
address both increasing voter registration and removing ineligible
persons from the state’s voter registration rolls.366 The Act requires
states to implement a program that makes a “reasonable effort” to
remove those from the rolls who either died or changed their
residence.367 It also includes various provisions to ensure that people
are not improperly removed.368 The Act permits a state to remove a
voter if a post card is sent to them to confirm their address, the card is
not returned, and the voter does not vote in the next two general federal
elections.369 The NVRA “treats the failure to return a card as some
gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams, challenged the purge of 120,000 of those
voters in response. Id. The state re-instated 22,000 voters who were removed from the
voting rolls but refused to reinstate the other 98,000. Id. The District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia upheld this decision on December 27, 2019. Hannah
Knowles, A Federal Judge Will Not Reverse Georgia’s Decision to Purge 100,000 Voters, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2019/12/28/federal-judge-will-not-reverse-georgias-decision-purge-voters.
362. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013).
363. Id. at 554.
364. On December 6, 2019, the House of Representatives passed the Voting Rights
Advancement Act, which “would restore and modernize the core protections of the
Voting Rights Act.” Feldman, supra note 278. Unless and until that bill is passed,
however, states will have near free reign to implement voter suppression laws.
365. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1317.
366. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1838 (2018).
367. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(2012).
368. § 20507(b)–(d).
369. § 20507(d)(1), (d)(2)(A).
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evidence—but by no means conclusive proof—that the voter has moved.”370
Under Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” law, the Ohio Secretary of State
sends letters to registrants who have “not engage[d] in any voter activity”
for two consecutive years.371 These registrants are removed if they do not
return the card and “fail[] to vote in any election during the period of two
federal elections subsequent to the mailing of the confirmation notice.”372
The NVRA specifically states that the failure to vote may not serve as the
sole predicate for that voter’s removal.373
The Court upheld Ohio’s Supplemental Process under a textual
analysis and, in doing so, rediscovered its respect for legislative
findings. Counsel for the respondents argued that the failure to return
a card is worthless as evidence that the addressee has moved because
“[s]o many properly registered voters simply discard return cards.”374
In response, the Court stated it was clear that Congress placed
evidentiary value on a voter’s failure to return a card because it was one
of only two requirements for voter removal under the NVRA.375 Justice
Alito, in stark contrast to the Court’s lack of legislative deference in
Shelby County, stated “[w]e have no authority to dismiss the considered
judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature regarding the
probative value of a registrant’s failure to send back a return card.”376
Justice Alito criticized the dissenting justices for advancing policy
arguments against Ohio and Congress, instead of simply interpreting
the statute.377 His attempt to frame Husted as simply a “dry exercise in
bureaucratic mechanics and statutory interpretation” is hardly
surprising.378 The Supreme Court has employed this technique time and
again, “turn[ing] a blind eye to the motivation behind, and effect of” laws
that restrict the right to vote.379 As a result, those laws upheld by the Court
370. Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1839.
371. Id. at 1840.
372. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.21(B)(2) (West 2020).
373. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2).
374. Husted, 138 S. Ct at 1845.
375. Id. at 1845–46.
376. Id. at 1846.
377. Id. at 1848.
378. The Supreme Court 2017 Term: Leading Case: Federal Statutes: National Voter
Registration Act—Statutory Interpretation—Election Law—Husted v. A. Philip Randolph
Institute, 132 HARV. L. REV. 437, 442 (2018) [hereinafter Supreme Court 2017 Term].
379. Id. Justice Sotomayor similarly argues that the majority “entirely ignores the
history of voter suppression against which the NVRA was enacted and upholds a
program that appears to further the very disenfranchisement of minority and lowincome voters that Congress set out to eradicate.” Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1865
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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have “serve[d] as models for states interested in restricting the
franchise.”380 Husted is simply the latest example of this practice.381
Husted is best understood in the context of America’s “history of
voter suppression.”382 Post-ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment,
blacks were voted into local and federal office in record numbers.383
During Reconstruction, voters elected over one thousand black men,
including the first sixteen black congressmen.384 Their success was
short lived.385 The end of Reconstruction led to a “a new era of voter
suppression.”386 States used legal methods such poll taxes and literacy
tests to deny blacks the right to vote.387 Blacks also faced “extrajudicial
violence,”388 which states “tacitly condoned.”389 These practices
“dramatically decreased black voter registration and turnout.”390
Even though voting restrictions such as poll taxes and literacy tests
were obviously designed to disenfranchise blacks,391 “the Supreme
Court upheld them by focusing on their facial neutrality.”392 For
example, the Court upheld a literacy test in Williams v. Mississippi393

380. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 442.
381. Id. On September 6, 2019, Ohio purged 182,000 voters from its rolls. The state
purged 158,000 of those voters for voter inactivity under the Supplemental Process.
Rick Rouan, Vast Majority of the 180,000 Ohio Voters Purged Because They Didn’t Vote,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 30, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/news/
20190930/vast-majority-of-180000-ohio-voters-purged-because-they-didnt-vote
[https://perma.cc/WEF2-XCDU].
382. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 442.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 442–43.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 443.
389. See Zanita E. Fenton, Disarming State Action; Discharging State Responsibility, 52
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 52–53 (2017) (discussing how state officials during the
Reconstruction era inequitably enforced firearms laws to intentionally leave black
citizens vulnerable to lynch mobs).
390. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443.
391. Id. at 442–43. See generally TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION:
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE 17–20 (2012) (describing how
Southern states in the Reconstruction era intentionally implemented poll taxes and literacy
tests to suppress poor and uneducated black voters and administered the poll taxes and
literacy tests discriminately to white and black citizens).
392. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443; see, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 141
(2004) (“The decision in Williams v. Mississippi (1898) rejected a facial challenge to a literacy
test . . . on the ground that the legislative motive was irrelevant to constitutionality.”).
393. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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because “it has not been shown that [the literacy test’s] actual
administration was evil.”394 Other states were encouraged by the
Court’s “initial willingness to permit voter suppression.”395 For
example, months after the Court decided Williams, Democrats in
North Carolina “organized an election day coup d’état” in which
whites murdered “scores of black men, women, and children.”396 The
leaders of the coup declared that they would “no longer be ruled and
will never again be ruled, by men of African origin.”397 “By 1908, every
ex-Confederate state had implemented” voter suppression laws.398 The
Court routinely upheld these laws on technicalities rather than address
the discriminatory intent behind the legislation.399
In the 1903 decision Giles v. Harris,400 the Court upheld Alabama’s
Constitution, which was devised to exclude blacks from the political
process.401 The Court held that the plaintiffs could seek relief from
their state government or Congress, but not the federal courts.402 In
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,403 the Court upheld
North Carolina’s literacy test.404 North Carolina justified the test as a
way to prevent fraud.405
On the heels of Shelby County and Husted, Republican-controlled
states have found “new ways to prevent minority voters from reaching
the polls.”406 Like the voter suppression laws of the past, the new laws
are “cloaked with benign justifications like preventing fraud or
ensuring faith in the democratic process.”407 They are “couched in
racially neutral terms,” even though they target black voters.408

394. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443 (quoting Williams, 170 U.S. at 225).
395. Id. at 443.
396. Id.; see also Adrienne LaFrance & Vann R. Newkirk II, The Lost History of an
American Coup D’État, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/08/wilmington-massacre/536457.
397. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443 (quoting HARRY HAYDEN, THE
STORY OF THE WILMINGTON REBELLION 10 (1936), http://core.ecu.edu/umc/
wilmington /scans/ticketTwo/hayden.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB3W-42NU]).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
401. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 443–44.
402. Id. at 444.
403. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
404. Id. at 53–54.
405. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 444.
406. Id.
407. Id (footnote omitted).
408. Id.
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Disenfranchisement of black voters is “a feature, not a bug” of these
new laws.409 The Court, much like it did during the Jim Crow era, has
“all but given its blessing to voter suppression.”410 By invalidating the
VRA’s coverage formula for preclearance in Shelby County, the Court
invited previously covered jurisdictions to continue to restrict minority
voters’ “access to the polls.”411 In Abbot v. Perez,412 the Court upheld
racially gerrymandered district maps in Texas.413 The Court used
“hyper-technical language about jurisdiction and statutory
construction.”414 However, the decision effectively gave election map
drawers the green light to design maps that infringe upon the voting
rights of minorities.415 In Gill v. Whitford,416 the Court “manufactured a
procedural dodge” to uphold Wisconsin’s gerrymandered maps,
despite clear evidence that the legislature gerrymandered the districts
to dilute minority voting power.417
Husted’s textual interpretation may be defensible, much like the
facially neutral poll tax and literacy laws could be defended on textual
grounds.418 Ignoring the broader context of voter suppression
throughout the nation’s past when interpreting new facially neutral
voting laws disregards the struggle of generations who risked their lives for
voting rights.419 Like previous decisions that upheld voter suppression laws,
Husted provides a “roadmap” for other states interested in suppressing
minority voters.420 At least twelve Republican-controlled state legislatures
have signaled their plans to enact similar voter purge laws.421
In Shelby County, the Roberts Court invalidated overwhelmingly
bipartisan legislation intended to protect minority voters.422 The Court did
this despite extensive Congressional fact finding that indicated the
409. Id.
410. Id. at 445.
411. Id.
412. 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
413. Id. at 2313–14.
414. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 445 (quoting Guy-Uriel E. Charles
& Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Abbot v. Perez, Race, and the Immodesty of the Roberts Court, HARV.
L. REV. BLOG (July 31, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/abbott-v-perez-raceand-the-immodesty-of-the-roberts-court [https://perma.cc/TNT6-YZBY]).
415. Id.
416. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
417. Supreme Court 2017 Term, supra note 378, at 445.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 445–46.
420. Id. at 446.
421. Id.
422. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
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continued need for the coverage formula and preclearance.423 There, the
Court showed no deference, at all, to Congress’s judgment. In Husted,
however, the Court was willing to defer to legislative judgment. According
to Justice Alito, the Court had “no authority to dismiss the considered
judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature,” even though the link
between moving and failing to return a letter is tenuous at best.424
When faced with a law that expands democratic participation, like
the VRA, the Court is unlikely to defer to legislative judgment that the
law is necessary. When faced with a law that restricts democratic
participation, the Court will have no problem deferring to legislative
judgment. The combined effect of these judicial policies has had, and
will continue to have, a devastating effect on our democracy.
C. Rucho v. Common Cause
The Court struck its most recent blow to democracy in Rucho v.
Common Cause.425 This case dealt with partisan gerrymandering in
Maryland and North Carolina, where the map drawers did not bother
to hide their insidious motives.426 In Maryland, the Democraticcontrolled legislature moved approximately 360,000 voters out of a
traditionally Republican area with the explicit goal of “flipping” the
district.427 In North Carolina, the Republican-controlled legislature
gerrymandered the entire Congressional election map.428 Representative
David Lewis, a districting committee co-chair stated, “I think electing
Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help
foster what I think is better for the country.”429 The district courts in both
cases struck down the gerrymandered maps as unconstitutional under the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.430 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, consolidated the cases, and reversed.431
The Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims present a
nonjusticiable political question because the Court lacks “judicially
423. Id. at 565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
424. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018).
425. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
426. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bars Challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/supremecourt-gerrymandering.html.
427. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493.
428. Id. at 2491.
429. Id. (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 809 (M.D.N.C. 2018)).
430. See Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (D. Md. 2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019); Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 799–801, vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
431. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
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discoverable and manageable standards” to resolve such claims.432
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,433 argued that partisan
gerrymandering claims require judges to determine a “fair” amount of
political representation for a party.434 However, federal courts do not
have a “‘clear, manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness.”435
Fairness might be defined in different ways that lead to different
results.436 The Court held that selecting a definition of fairness is
“beyond the competence of the federal courts” because it “poses basic
questions that are political, not legal.”437 Even if courts did have a
“neutral baseline” from which to measure fairness, they would still lack
a “discernible and manageable standard[] for deciding” the
“determinative question: ‘How much is too much?’”438
The Court also used originalist reasoning in support of its holding. The
Framers, who were well aware of partisan gerrymandering, assigned
districting to the state legislatures subject to Congressional regulation
through the Elections Clause.439 Therefore, the Framers never envisioned
the federal courts playing any role in districting, according to the
majority.440 Federal courts, the majority held, have no authority to
“reallocate political power between the two major political parties.”441
The Court acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering is
“incompatible with democratic principles.”442 This does not mean,
however, that “the solution lies with the federal judiciary.”443 Instead,
affected voters can rely on state statutes and constitutions to “provide
standards and guidance for state courts” in partisan gerrymandering
432. Id. at 2496 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961)).
433. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion.
Id. at 2490.
434. Id. at 2499–500.
435. Id. at 2500.
436. Id. The Court noted that if “fair” means having competitive districts, then a
close election could lead to one party taking all the seats, even though it won the
popular vote by a slim margin. Id. If “fair” means achieving roughly proportional
representation, then there will likely be fewer competitive districts. Id. If “fair” means
adhering to “traditional” districting criteria, such as protecting incumbents, keeping
communities of interest together, and respecting the natural geography, then the
resulting maps may still lead to packed and cracked districts. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 2501, 2505.
439. Id. at 2495.
440. Id. at 2496.
441. Id. at 2507.
442. Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
443. Id.
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cases.444 Alternatively, the Court held, states may choose to adopt
independent commissions to control the districting process.445 The
Court also noted that Congress is free to reform partisan
gerrymandering through the Elections Clause.446
Justice Kagan posed a simple question in her blistering dissent: “Is this
how American democracy is supposed to work?”447 Elections are supposed
to reflect the sovereignty of the people over their representatives, she
argued.448 Partisan gerrymandering, however, turns that idea on its head by
allowing representatives to “cherry-pick voters to ensure their reelection.”449
The result: Election Day is rendered “meaningless.”450
Justice Kagan acknowledged that partisan gerrymandering has been
a part of American elections since the country’s earliest days. However,
advances in data science and technology ensure that modern
gerrymandering—like the kind seen in North Carolina and
Maryland—is far more effective than the “crude linedrawing of the
past.”451 Both map drawers used advanced statistical models to create

444. Id. at 2507. North Carolina Democrats have filed a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of their congressional map as a partisan gerrymander under the state
constitution. Rick Hasen, Democrats File New Lawsuit Challenging North Carolina
Congressional Districts as Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymandering Under the State
Constitution; Too Late?, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2019, 9:56 AM), https://
electionlawblog.org/?p=107497 [https://perma.cc/D4TP-NQVL].
445. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
446. Id. at 2495. Chief Justice Roberts noted that Congress has introduced “dozens”
of bills aimed at curbing partisan gerrymandering over the years. Id. at 2508. As Justice
Kagan points out in her dissent, “what all these bills have in common is that they are
not laws.” Id. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
447. Id. at 2509.
448. Id. at 2511.
449. Id. at 2512.
450. Id.
451. Id.
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“voter-proof map[s].”452 “These are not your grandfather’s—let alone
the Framers’—gerrymanders,” she argued.453
Justice Kagan further contended that federal courts are capable of
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims and that the District
Court decisions are proof of this.454 These courts used their state’s own
districting criteria, “apart from partisan gain,” as a neutral baseline
from which to measure partisan gerrymandering.455 Then, the courts
used a three-prong test for vote dilution to determine intent, effects,
and causation—an “utterly ordinary” test for a lawyer to apply.456 The
majority, oddly, claimed that federal courts are incapable of
adjudicating these claims but that voters may turn to state courts for
relief.457 Justice Kagan noted this inconsistency, asking “[i]f [state
courts] can develop and apply neutral and manageable standards to
identify unconstitutional gerrymanders, why couldn’t we?”458
According to Justice Kagan, the majority’s decision is a stunning
abdication of the Court’s duty under Marbury v. Madison459 to “say what

452. Id. at 2511–13. Justice Kagan noted that Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a Republican
districting specialist, used “sophisticated technological tools and precinct-level
election results selected to predict voting behavior” to ensure Republicans won ten out
of the thirteen North Carolina congressional seats. Id. at 2510. Dr. Hofeller also helped
gerrymander maps for the Republicans in Texas, Missouri, Virginia, Alabama, Florida,
and West Virginia. David Daly, GOP Racial Gerrymandering Mastermind Participated in
Redistricting in More States than Previously Known, Files Reveal, INTERCEPT (Sept. 23, 2019,
3:13 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/09/23/gerrymandering-gop-west-virginiaflorida-alabama [https://perma.cc/C3WC-54TY]. According to reporter David Daly,
some of Hofeller’s now unearthed documents show that he and other Republican
mapmakers “experimented with using race as the primary factor in drawing districts
in [Alabama, Florida, and West Virginia]—a tactic ruled unconstitutional under the
14th Amendment’s [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause.” Id.
453. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
454. Id. at 2516; see also Zachary Roth, The Supreme Court Won’t Stop Partisan
Gerrymandering. Now What?, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 28, 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/scotus-gerrymandering-ruling-what-now
[https://perma.cc/25WH-5S4V] (noting that “five different federal courts, relying on
the work of respected political scientists, have had little trouble coming up with
manageable standards to strike down partisan gerrymanders in Wisconsin, North
Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, and Maryland”).
455. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan notes that using
a state’s own districting criteria as a neutral baseline ensures that judges do not come
up with baselines out of thin air, as the majority fears. Id.
456. Id. at 2516–17.
457. Id. at 2515, 2524.
458. Id. at 2524.
459. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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the law is.”460 Indeed, the majority balked at the idea of “unelected and
politically unaccountable” federal judges intervening in partisan
politics.461 What the Court failed to account for, however, is that judicial
review is not necessarily undemocratic or counter-majoritarian. As John
Hart Ely argued in Democracy and Distrust, judicial review can actually be
“representation reinforcing” when courts strike down undemocratic
practices or statutes.462 Baker v. Carr463 and Reynolds v. Sims464, which
established the one-person-one-vote principle, are clear examples of how
judicial review can be representation reinforcing.465 Michael C. Dorf
argues that “[c]ourts ought not, in the name of democracy, defer to
legislatures in the drawing of district lines when the very complaint at
issue charges that the lines they have drawn disrespect democratic
principles. In such cases, an intervening court acts as the protector of
democracy and majoritarianism.”466
The Rucho Court’s legislative deference, therefore, is wholly
inappropriate. The Court purports to protect the political process from
judicial arbitrariness in defining a “manageable standard.”467 In doing so,
however, the Court fails to protect that process by effectively green-lighting
partisan gerrymandering,468 a practice that the majority acknowledges is
“incompatible with democratic principles.”469 As Michael C. Dorf puts it,
the Court “thr[ew] out the baby with the bathwater.”470 Voters who live in
states without ballot initiatives or independent districting commissions are
now forced to rely on their representatives—the ones who stand to benefit
the most from partisan gerrymandering—for reform.471

460. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
461. Id. at 2507.
462. Michael C. Dorf, U.K. Supreme Court Prorogation Judgment Exemplifies RepresentationReinforcing Judicial Review, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Oct. 2, 2019), https://verdict.justia.
com/2019/10/02/u-k-supreme-court-prorogation-judgment-exemplifies-representationreinforcing-judicial-review [https://perma.cc/5U2G-6RZH] (quoting JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980)).
463. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
464. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
465. Dorf, supra note 462.
466. Id.
467. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2428, 2491 (2019).
468. Dorf, supra note 462.
469. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
470. Dorf, supra note 462.
471. As Justice Kagan notes, under these circumstances the “chances for legislative
reform are slight.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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As this Article has discussed, the Roberts Court is not always so
hesitant to overturn legislative judgment.472 The underlying theme in
these cases is that the Court will defer to the legislature when faced
with an antiparticipatory policy. Thus, partisan gerrymandering, a
practice that clearly threatens voter participation, earned the Court’s
deference. Rucho, therefore, falls squarely within the Shelby County,
Citizens United, and Husted trend.473 These cases demonstrate that the
Roberts Court “simply do[es]n’t believe that political equality—the
idea that Americans must be able to participate in the political process
on a more or less equal footing—is a crucial value to be upheld.”474
CONCLUSION
The Court’s persistence throughout the past decade in overturning
“outputs of the political process” has weakened American democracy. The
deterioration began with the Court’s blockbuster decision in Citizen’s
United, which bestowed upon already influential corporations the power to
shape American democracy with limitless largesse.475 This decision had the
decisive effect of quieting the voices of American citizens who seek to
choose their elected representatives, a foundational right afforded to all
Americans. The effects of Citizens United are enduring.
This enduring impact was epitomized by the Court in its decision in
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, in which it conclusively
denied an opportunity to reexamine the Court’s Citizens United
decision.476 In the eyes of the Court, Citizens United was settled law
because it said so, period.477 This basis alone was enough for the Court
to refuse to hear oral arguments on the issue and rather summarily
declare that the case, in fact, posed an irrefutable issue. The Court
similarly rejected an opportunity to endorse a democratically enacted
campaign finance system in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett despite
the system’s proven ability to promote robust political campaigns.478 In
holding that the matching fund law violated the First Amendment, the

472. Michael C. Dorf points out that the Roberts Court has been “perfectly happy
to overturn outputs of the political process” in the gun control and affirmative action
context. Dorf, supra note 462.
473. Roth, supra note 454.
474. Id.
475. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41, 351 (2010).
476. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516–17 (2012) (per curium).
477. Johnstone, supra note 119, at 15.
478. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28
(2011) (per curium).
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Court triggered the repulsion of public financing systems across the
nation—further demolishing the American democratic system.
Faced with yet another opportunity in 2014, in McCutcheon v. FEC, to
revitalize democratic values in the campaign finance sphere, the Court
rejected the idea that aggregate limits target quid pro quo corruption
and provided wealthy corporations the power to write blank checks—
supplanting the voices of millions of Americans as collateral.479 While
a cap on individual campaign contributions remains in place, if the
Court’s persistent actions over the past decade are any indication, it is
certainly possible that if faced with this issue in coming years, the Court
will eradicate all contribution limits.
The Court again failed to admonish quid pro quo corruption—a pervasive
issue that continues to plague our democratic institutions—in McDonnell v.
United States.480 The Court reinforced the ubiquity of bribery by narrowly
defining an “official act” and, in doing so, conferred immeasurable power to
lobbyists and anticampaign regulation activists alike.481
The Court did not confine its decade long assault on representationreinforcing values to campaign finance. Rather, the Court dealt blow after
blow to voting rights as well. In Shelby County, the Court struck down the
coverage formula of the VRA, effectively neutering the preclearance
provision essential to the Act.482 The decision immediately impacted
voting rights for the worse.483 Previously covered states enacted voter
identification laws, limited early voting, closed polling locations, and
implemented various other obstacles to voting.484 Section 2 remains in
place, but it is entirely insufficient to attack the ever-evolving methods of
voter disenfranchisement.485 In the Court’s eyes, the coverage formula was
outdated and unnecessary because “[o]ur country has changed.”486
However, 12,000 pages of legislative fact finding in support of this
overwhelmingly bipartisan Act suggest otherwise.487
The Court continued to undermine representation-reinforcement
in Husted. This time, the Court confronted an antiparticipatory
479. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206–09 (2014).
480. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371 (2016).
481. Id. at 2361.
482. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013).
483. Scott, supra note 302, at 123.
484. See supra notes 334–38 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
486. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 557.
487. As Congress noted, between 1982–2006, preclearance prevented over 700
discriminatory voting procedure changes from taking effect. See supra notes 268–71
and accompanying text.
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policy—Ohio’s voter purge law, the Supplemental Process. The Court
upheld the law, and as a result, 182,000 voters have been purged from
the rolls.488 The Supplemental Process uses a voter’s failure to return a
mailed card as evidence that the voter had moved.489 However, as
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the numbers do not support this
legislative judgment.490 Failing to return a card is essentially worthless
as evidence that a voter has moved.491 Considering the Court’s total
lack of deference to the extensive legislative fact finding in Shelby
County, one might have expected the Court to disregard Ohio’s flimsy
justifications here. Not so. The Court about-faced, and rubber-stamped
the law, declaring that the Court had “no authority to dismiss the
considered judgment” of the legislature.492 Faced with a law that
restricts access to the democratic process, the Court suddenly
rediscovered its respect for legislative judgment.
In Rucho, the Court faced partisan gerrymandering claims and had
yet another opportunity to reinforce representation values and protect
the democratic process. Instead of providing that protection, the
Court slammed the doors of the federal judiciary to partisan
gerrymandering claims, holding that such claims present a nonjusticiable
political question.493 According to Justice Roberts, federal courts lack a
“‘clear, manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness” to determine
when partisan gerrymandering has gone too far.494 The Court held that
the solution lies with Congress, state legislatures, or state courts.495
488. See Rouan, supra note 381.
489. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1838 (2018).
490. Id. at 1850 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer cited certain statistics: “about
4% of all Americans . . . move outside of their county each year.” Id. at 1856. When
Ohio sent out the notices to registered voters, pursuant to the Supplemental Process,
about one million—the “vast majority”—of them did not send back a return card. Id.
These “1 million or so voters accounted for about 13% of Ohio’s voting population.”
Id. If all these people had actually moved, that would mean “vastly more people must
move each year in Ohio than is generally true of the roughly 4% of all Americans who
move to a different county nationwide (not all of whom are registered voters).” Id.
Ohio did not offer any reason to suggest that more people move within its state than
the rest of the country. The likely explanation, Justice Breyer concluded, is “the human
tendency not to send back cards received in the mail,” which is “confirmed strongly by
the actual numbers in this record.” Id. Therefore, the failure to send back the notice
“shows nothing at all that is statutorily significant.” Id. at 1856–57. Accordingly, it
“cannot reasonably indicate a change of address.” Id. at 1857.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1846 (majority opinion).
493. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
494. Id. at 2500.
495. Id. at 2506–07.
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However, the Court offered no reason why state courts have jurisdiction
to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims but federal courts are not.
Furthermore, the Court failed to consider that modern map drawers use
advanced computer programs and data to create “voter-proof map[s].”496
Incumbent politicians use these maps to “cherry-pick voters to ensure their
reelection.”497 As a result, voters feel a “sense of disenfranchisement,” and
lose faith in the American system of representative government.498
Over the past decade, the Court’s decisions in both the campaign
finance and voting rights contexts have undermined representationreinforcing values by increasing the concentration of political power
in the rich and powerful and, in turn, reducing the role of the average
citizen in his or her democracy.
As this Article was in its final edits during April of 2020, just prior to
going to print, the Court intervened on the eve of Wisconsin’s primary
election, in the midst of a global pandemic, and in the words of Justice
Ginsburg, “prevent voters who timely requested absentee ballots from
casting their votes.”499 The Court’s ruling required citizens to do the
unimaginable: postmark an absentee ballot, that they had yet to receive,
within twenty-four hours.500
With a severe backlog of absentee ballot requests that had
overwhelmed election officials’ capacity to mail the ballots to voters
promptly, the Court made voting a matter of life or health.501 Voters’
only alternative to time travel? Stand in line, for hours, with hundreds
of fellow should-have-been social distancing citizens, in the midst of
the pandemic, at one of the few in-person polling locations that had
not been preemptively closed due to the virus. Did the burden of this
unconscionable choice fall equally on rich and poor? On black voters
and white voters? Of course not. Did the Supreme Court’s five-to-four
majority turn a blind eye? Of course it did.
Thus it came to pass that on April 7, 2020, just ten years and three months
removed from Citizens United, voters who wished to exercise the franchise
were forced either to mail a timely requested absentee ballot that they had
not yet received, or risk their health and that of others by voting in person.

496. Id. at 2511 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
497. Id. at 2512.
498. Id. at 2504 (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 523 (D. Md.
2018), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)).
499. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19A1016, slip op. at
1 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
500. Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
501. Id. at 4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Voters in Milwaukee, the city with the state’s most substantial black
population, saw their normal allotment of one hundred eighty polling
locations reduced to a mere five.502
Five polling locations in the city of Milwaukee.
Five votes on the Supreme Court.
And as a coda reflective of the Court’s unwaveringly callous role in
the Decade of Democracy’s Demise, it bears noting that, due to health
concerns, the Supreme Court had been operating remotely since
March.503 Thus, all nine of the justices’ votes were cast remotely—an
option the five-member majority effectively and sadly fittingly denied
to thousands of voters in Wisconsin.

502. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/opinion/wisconsin-primary-supreme-court.html.
503. Laura Basset, The Supreme Court Just Signed the Death Warrant for Voters, GQ (Apr. 7,
2020), https://www.gq.com/story/supreme-court-voting-death-warrant [https://perma.cc/
6MWU-TAWS].

